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PARALLEL JUSTICE: CREATING CAUSES OF ACTION FOR
MANDATORY MEDIATION
Marie A. Failinger*
The American common law system should adopt court-connected mandatory media-
tion as a parallel system of justice for some cases that are currently not justiciable,
such as wrongs caused by constitutionally protected behavior. As evidence that such
a system is practical, this Article describes systemic and ethical parallels between
court-connected mediation and the rise of the equity courts in medieval England,
demonstrating that there are no insurmountable practical objections to the creation
of “mediation-only” causes of action.  The Article then explores the constitutional
concerns surrounding the idea of “mandatory mediation-only” causes of action,
using constitutional hate speech and invasion of privacy cases to test the validity of
these concerns.
INTRODUCTION
At its edges, the common law tradition is broken and inadequate
to respond to human suffering that nevertheless cries out for jus-
tice. Judges sometimes struggle to name visible injustices and to
acknowledge that they cannot provide a remedy because a claim is
non-justiciable.1 This does not have to be so. The steady growth of
court-annexed mediation2 and the development of the restorative
justice movement3 have created an opening to provide a measure of
justice to victims of non-justiciable cases. Court-annexed mediation
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. I am grateful to my colleague
Sharon Press for reading and commenting on this draft, and for George Blesi’s and Molly
Considine’s research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Triplett v. St. Amour, 507 N.W.2d 194, 200 (Mich. 1993) (quoting Columbia
Cas. Co. v. Klettke, 244 N.W. 162 (Mich. 1932)) (rejecting a cause of action for fraud in
inducing a tort settlement, and noting that “[t]his rule seems harsh, for often a party will lose
valuable rights because of the perjury of his adversary. However, public policy seems to de-
mand that there be an end to litigation . . . . ‘[T]he wrong in such case, is of course a most
grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule
could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the
evil to be remedied.’”); see also Keane v. State, 166 A. 410, 413 (Md. 1933) (rejecting a writ of
coram nobis for a man convicted on the basis of mistaken eyewitness testimony and noting that
“[i]t is unfortunate that there is no complete and adequate remedy for such a wrong as that
of which the petitioner complains, but this court cannot create a remedy where none exists,
since its function is to discover and apply existing law and not to make new law”).
2. For a description of the advent of court-annexed or court-connected mediation, see
Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from the
Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399 (2005).
3. For a description of the basic principles and practices of restorative justice, see HOW-
ARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2002) (hereinafter LITTLE BOOK).
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can honor the policies that prevent courts from pronouncing judg-
ment in these cases while offering the victims the remedy of an
encounter with their wrongdoers. At least some justice is possible
through mediation, which has evolved from a private, consensual
undertaking disconnected from legal process to become a fully in-
tegrated part of our civil judicial system.4 Similarly, restorative
justice has taken a respected place as a viable alternative to retribu-
tive justice in criminal court.5
Indeed, proposals for legal system reform using alternative meth-
ods of dispute resolution continue to dare the American legal
system to diversify its approaches to conflict. Harvard Law School
ADR expert Frank Sander has argued that we should diversify the
types of conflict resolution processes available “at the courthouse
door” to manage currently recognized causes of action.6 In his vi-
sion, a panoply of dispute resolution opportunities—including
counseling, mediation, negotiation, and litigation itself—should be
available to potential litigants as an integrated part of any justice
system.7 In fact, ADR practice has confirmed that alternatives to
traditional litigation can be valuable assets for any judicial system,
whether litigants entering the courthouse door are directed to an
appropriate process or public adjudication is pre-empted through
privately arranged arbitration, negotiation, or mediation before a
conflict ever reaches the courthouse.8
4. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 400 (“There can be little doubt that court-
connected mediation has been successful in achieving widespread institutionalization in the
nation’s courts.”).
5. See, e.g., Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or Foe? A Systemic
Look at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667, 668–69 (2005) (noting that
“[v]ictim-offender mediation, family group conferencing, sentencing circles, and reparative
boards” can be found throughout the U.S. judicial system and that there has been an “up-
surge” in such programs).
6. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 402–04 (describing Sander’s introduction of
the idea at a conference to commemorate the Pound lectures in St. Paul and the task force
recommendations that resulted from it); see also A Dialogue Between Professors Frank Sander and
Mariana Hernandez Crespo: Exploring the Evolution of the Multi-door Courthouse, 5 ST. THOMAS L.J.
665, 670 (2008) (noting that the multi-door courthouse idea “is to look at different forms of
dispute resolution . . . and see whether we could work out some kind of taxonomy of which
disputes ought to go where, and which doors are appropriate for which disputes”).
7. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 402.
8. Currently, ADR is available for voluntary dispute resolution through private
mediators, but in many states it is also available to parties who can state a legally cognizable
claim in court, such as a petition for divorce or personal injury claim, who may be offered or
even ordered to attempt mediation or another form of ADR before a court will consider their
claims. See, e.g., Sharon B. Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 903, 905–06 (1997) (noting that “[t]he President of the United States routinely
deploys mediators to assist with international crises, ballplayers routinely seek arbitration to
resolve contract disputes, and students nationwide, some as young as elementary school age,
participate in peer mediation programs”); see also Lela Love & Joseph B. Stulberg, The Uses of
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Expanding on this vision, I argue that American lawmakers
should make use of court-integrated ADR systems by recognizing
new substantive causes of action remediable solely by mandatory
mediation and similar restorative practices, such as sentencing cir-
cles and family group conferencing.9 Many injustices currently go
without remedy because there is no recognized cause of action for
that harm, a plaintiff cannot meet an element of a recognized cause
of action, or there is a defense to the claim, such as a constitutional
bar. Even if a court cannot properly impose involuntary sanctions,
such as criminal punishment, civil damages, or injunctive relief,
these harms can be recognized through “mediation-only” causes of
action. These actions would enable judges to order mandatory
court-annexed mediation or similar restorative practices. Creating
mediation-only causes of action offers the promise of healing vic-
tims’ injuries and transforming their relationships with wrongdoers
while avoiding traditional objections to the use of court coercion to
redress or prevent behavior that clearly offends community morals.
Part I describes how such a system might procedurally work, us-
ing a few examples of constitutional problems that demonstrate the
inadequacy of common law justice in a system of individual rights.
In Part II, I argue that the creation of a separate track or legal sys-
tem for currently non-justiciable causes of action is not as radical as
it may first appear; there are instructive parallels between the equity
Mediation, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 573, 574 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christo-
pher Honeyman eds., 2006) (noting the use of mediation in controversies from the Internet,
on the street, or schools to cases filed in court).
9. Sentencing circles are offered to willing defendants and victims as alternatives to
judicial sentence adjudication. KAY PRANIS ET AL., PEACEMAKING CIRCLES: FROM CRIME TO COM-
MUNITY 21 (2003). In a typical circle, the defendant, his representatives, a prosecutor,
sometimes the judge, sometimes family of defendant or victim, other professionals, and
members of the community may be called to talk about the offense and its impact on both its
direct victim and the community at large. The circle also tries to identify alternatives to incar-
ceration that will better repair the harm to the victim (viewed as more than damages or other
legal harm) while holding the offender accountable for his wrongdoing but still restoring his
ties to the community. For an example, see id. at 15–16, 21–22. Family group conferencing,
which is widely used in New Zealand, brings the family of a juvenile (usually) together with
criminal justice professionals and community members to understand the relationship be-
tween the offense and the family system and enlists families in responses that will
permanently alter the dynamics that led a juvenile into crime. See Allison Morris & Gabrielle
Maxwell, Restorative Justice in New Zealand: Family Group Conferences as a Case Study, 1998 WEST.
CRIMINOLOGY REV. 1, 3–4 (1998), available at http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v1n1/morris.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2013). For an example, see PRANIS ET AL., supra, at 22. For a discussion of the
history of restorative justice, see Anthony J. Nocella II, An Overview of the History and Theory of
Transformative Justice, 6 PEACE & CONFLICT REV. 1, 3–5 (2011), available at http://www.review.
upeace.org/pdf.cfm?articulo=124&ejemplar=23 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013); see also Howard
Vogel, The Restorative Justice Wager: The Promise and Hope of a Value-based Dialogue Driven Ap-
proach to Conflict Resolution for Social Healing, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 565, 568–70
(2007).
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court system that emerged out of the common law and court-an-
nexed mediation practices that suggest the viability and value of
this project. Part III considers standard objections to the use of
mandatory mediation, a concept that seems incoherent in light of
the birth of mediation as a voluntary process.
Part IV describes how a system might be designed to identify
cases appropriate for mandatory mediation only. Finally, Part V
briefly explores how these causes of action might be framed in con-
stitutional cases and considers whether such new causes of action
will defeat substantive and procedural values that have made such
claims non-justiciable. It is fair to test the proposal for mediation-
only claims against existing constitutional rights cases because these
cases are perhaps my proposal’s most difficult challenge. Allowing
such claims potentially implicates critical democratic values embed-
ded in our protection of speech and the press.
Although I will use constitutional cases to test this proposal, it is
not meant to be limited to cases with constitutional difficulties. As
one potential application, states may find a mediation-only pathway
helpful to respond to injuries sounding in tort where it is difficult
to establish some elements of a cause of action. For example, the
mediation pathway might be used where causation is difficult to es-
tablish in mass tort cases; where it is hard to measure damages
because the plaintiff has no material or physical injury; and even
cases where standard equitable remedies, like injunctions, will not
serve to redress the wrongdoing.10 Causes of action remediable only
through mandatory mediation would be valuable in states that have
been reluctant, on public policy grounds, to recognize causes of
action for wrongs as various as publication of private facts and false
light privacy torts, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in employment, workplace and cyberspace bullying, or even
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against lawyers.11
10. For example, causation problems have bedeviled plaintiffs exposed to toxic waste
torts. See, e.g., Ora Fred Harris, Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is there Any Hope
of Reconciliation?, 40 SW. L.J. 909, 944–46 (1986). The tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress is often compensated with damages in only the most egregious cases. Adam J. Kolber,
The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 622 (2011) (noting requirements in some
jurisdictions that victims suffer physical injury or be within a “zone of danger” to recover for
this tort).
11. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 CAL. L.
REV. 1711, 1720–21, 1761–62 (2010) (describing some states’ reluctance to extend privacy
torts to include publication of private facts or false light cases and noting other cases where
courts were reluctant to find outrageous conduct for IIED cases); James J. Brudney, Reluc-
tance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in American Employment Law, 32
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J., 773, 773–74 (2011) (discussing reluctance of states to provide
causes of action for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in at-will employ-
ment situations); Alex B. Long, Lawyers Intentionally Inflicting Emotional Distress, 42 SETON
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I. RE-IMAGINING THE COURSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
To explore the potential value of mediation-only causes of ac-
tion, consider two difficult cases where the common law,
constrained by constitutional values, failed to provide any real jus-
tice to injured victims. One is nearly forty years old—the American
Nazi proposal to march through Skokie Illinois—and one is rela-
tively recent—the Westboro Baptist Church picket of the funeral of
Lance Corporal James Snyder.12
In 1977, a small band of neo-Nazis proposed to march in Sko-
kie,13 a town where Holocaust victims who immigrated to America
thought they would be safe.14 The proposed march was announced
with a poster depicting a figure with a hand around his throat and
the words, “We are Coming” and “Smash the Jew System.”15 For the
Nazis, this planned march was in part a taunt to Chicago officials
who had stymied previous plans to protest the racial integration of
Marquette Park by requiring a $250,000 parade bond to march in
Chicago.16 For as many as 7,000 survivors of the Nazi camps who
HALL L. J. 55 (2012) (discussing courts’ reluctance to permit IIED claims against lawyers);
Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. Whit, Workplace Harassment in the Academic Environment, 56 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 8 (2011) (noting courts’ reluctance to recognize causes of action for workplace
bullying). But see Geoffrey Rapp, Defense Against Outrage and the Perils of Parasitic Torts, 45 GA.
L. REV. 107, 138–42 (2010) (noting the expansion of courts’ use of negligent infliction of
emotional distress, including the elimination of the significant physical injury requirement).
12. In National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977), the Na-
tional Socialist Party of America challenged an injunction issured by a Cook County, Illinois
court prohibiting them from marching through the town of Skokie, a town inhabited by
scores of Holocaust victims, while wearing Nazi uniforms or showing swastikas. An account of
this case is provided in PHILIPPA STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO SKOKIE: FREEDOM FOR
SPEECH WE HATE 1 (1999). The story of Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011), a lawsuit by
the father of a dead Iraqi veteran against the church that picketed his funeral, is provided by
Joseph Russomanno, “Freedom for the Thought that We Hate”: Why Westboro Had to Win, 17 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 133 (2012).
13. See Geoffrey Stone, Remembering the Nazis in Skokie, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2009,
3:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/remembering-the-nazis-in_b_
188739.html.
14. STRUM, supra note 12, at 1 (describing the survivors’ belief that, as American citizens,
they should have the right “to live peacefully and safely, dealing as best they could with their
unspeakable memories of families brutally separated, of forced labor and starvation, and of
those who are forced into the gas chambers to die”).
15. Id. at 18, 98 (describing posters bearing Jewish caricatures and a poster of three
rabbis involved in a ritual murder of a Christian).
16. See id. at 5–6 (noting that local Caucasians blamed Jewish landlords for renting to
African Americans in Marquette Park); id. at 14–15 (noting that Collin may have been partic-
ularly upset because his office was in Marquette Park). In Collin’s view, African-American and
Jewish-American Chicagoans were linked. In addition to the help that Jewish landlords pro-
vided in desegregating parts of Chicago, the Nazis thought that Jews were involved in a
Federal Reserve and Communist conspiracy to take over economic power in the United
States, which was thwarting his organization’s goals of returning African Americans to Africa.
Id. at 13–14.
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had found refuge in Skokie, however, the sight of Nazi uniforms
brought back unspeakable memories: roaming gangs of Lithuani-
ans beating Jews to death with iron bats or stuffing water-hoses into
their mouths to drown them,17 as well as Jews burned to death,
raped, tortured, and murdered in Lithuanian prisons by guards.18
Nazi leader Frank Collin’s hateful words recalled “[d]eath in a most
horrible form, not only death to be shot in a moment to be killed
but death after torture.”19 Citing the First Amendment, the lower
federal courts refused to enjoin Collin from marching in Skokie.20
In the second difficult case, in 2006, the United States Supreme
Court refused to uphold a damages award made to the family of a
maligned dead Marine in Snyder v. Phelps.21 Albert Snyder lost his
twenty-year-old son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, in
Iraq.22 Matthew’s funeral was one of many military funerals pick-
eted by Reverend Phelps and members of the Westboro Baptist
Church (WBC).23 The WBC claims that soldier deaths in Afghani-
stan and Iraq are God’s punishment for the moral sins of American
society and government attempts to silence their preaching.24 Ac-
cordingly, the WBC’s members protested “outside of the [Snyders’]
church on the day of Matthew’s funeral, holding signs reading,
among other things, ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’ ‘God Hates
Fags,’ and ‘You’re Going to Hell.’”25 At times, WBC protesters were
only 200 to 300 feet from the funeral procession as it passed. 26 The
Catholic school across the street closed its blinds so schoolchildren
17. Id. at 10.
18. Id. Strum notes that the Lithuanians termed this rape/torture/murder practice as
“going to peel potatoes.” Id. Perhaps the most searing memory was of the “Children’s Action”
that tore children under eleven or twelve from their parents, threw them “into vans like
packages,” and destroyed everyone. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 98.
20. Id.
21. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
22. Ethan Fishman, To Secure These Rights: The Supreme Court and Snyder v. Phelps, 24 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 101, 101–02 (2011).
23. Id. at 102 (noting that the church has picketed hundreds of funerals in the past
twenty years).
24. The announcement that the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) would picket the fu-
neral at “St. John’s Catholic dog kennel” stated, “Killed by IED—like the IED America
Bombed WBC with in a terroristic effort to silence our anti-gay Gospel preaching by vio-
lence.” Brief for Petitioner, at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751), 2010
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 505, at 9. Fred Phelps, Sr., by contrast, admitted that he was picket-
ing funerals as revenge against all Marines because some of them assaulted him three years
previously. Id. at 6. His own expert admitted that the WBC signs were “personal” to the Sny-
der family and interfered with the family’s grieving process, thus contributing to Mr. Snyder’s
depression. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213 (also noting that the picketing occurred 1,000 feet from
the location of the funeral).
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would not have to face the protesters and press.27 More painfully,
the WBC posted a lengthy poem lambasting Lance Corporal Snyder
and his family. The poem claimed that his parents “raised him for
the devil” and stated that Matthew’s parents “RIPPED that body
apart and taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and to
commit adultery.”28 They claimed that God killed Matthew so the
WBC could preach God’s word of vengeance.29 Mr. Snyder vomited
after seeing this smear on the WBC website. In the wake of the fu-
neral, his diabetes was exacerbated; sinking into further depression,
he stated that he could never think about the funeral without
pain.30 Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Snyder’s claims for
defamation, intrusion on seclusion, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress that had resulted in a jury verdict of over ten
million dollars.31
These constitutional stories are perhaps more anguishing than
most. However, they underscore the constitutional conclusion that
the fear, anguish, and anger that these victims have suffered are an
acceptable price for a robust democracy.
What alternatives might have been available to Sol Goldstein,
one of the Holocaust survivors who confronted the Nazis in Skokie,
or Albert Snyder, Matthew’s father, if the common law recognized a
mediation-only process for the harms caused to them? A common
pathway to court-annexed mediation starts with a regular complaint
and then includes sometimes an answer, perhaps some discovery,
and then referral to court-annexed mediation processes.32 If these
processes fail, the mediation ends and the case continues.33 The
mediation referral often occurs early in the case, but in many cases,
parties are not precluded from filing additional pleadings or ob-
taining some discovery before the case is either settled or returned
to the district court.34
In a mediation-only system, cases like Mr. Snyder’s and Mr. Gold-
stein’s might initially be managed like standard litigation. That is, a
27. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 5.
28. Id. at 7–8.
29. See id. at 8.
30. Id.
31. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214, 1219–21.
32. Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Connected General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming
for Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution and the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR
JUDGES 1, 18–19 (2004) (describing the timing of ADR processes, which can occur from early
in the case to after discovery is completed).
33. Id. at 1306–07.
34. See Bobbi McAdoo et al., Institutionalization: What Do Empirical Studies Tell us about
Court Mediation?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003, at 9 (noting that cases are more likely to
settle if mediation occurs early in the litigation, though, in some cases, giving lawyers infor-
mation about the case through discovery and allowing some motions to be decided helps
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plaintiff would first plead a cognizable cause of action sounding
only in mediation, and a judicial decision-maker would determine
that the elements of this cause of action appear to make out a case
for mandatory mediation referral. The defendant Westboro Baptist
Church or Nazi Party could argue, as they can in the current system
through motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment,
that the case on its face does not meet the elements for mandatory
referral. A judicial officer would rule on that motion, finding either
that the plaintiff has not pleaded a cause of action eligible for
mandatory mediation or that the case should proceed to mediation.
Such motions could be decided by existing trial judges or law-
trained referees, or, in the alternative, judicial administrators could
rule on jurisdictional objections, followed by an appeal to a trial-
level judge. Many small claims or conciliation courts use a similar
appeals system.35 Additionally, jurisdictions considering a media-
tion-only pathway might opt to keep mediation complaints out of
public records, thereby encouraging defendants to continue in the
process. This is a common practice among parties that use
mediation.36
Although a court-annexed mediation-only cause of action would
thus initially resemble a traditional lawsuit, the pathway after this
point would look quite different. Plaintiffs and defendants would
not be entitled to utilize current discovery vehicles, such as deposi-
tions and interrogatories, to build their cases prior to mediation.
Rather, information-gathering from the opponent would occur just
as it does in current mediation practice—the parties and others
who may participate in the mediation would tell their stories and
voluntarily disclose any factual information they chose as part of the
process of bringing their own perspectives and needs to light.37
Though this process might seem frustrating or even unfair to law-
yers used to being able to compel factual information from their
adversaries in order to estimate the likelihood of success at trial,
cases to settle). See generally Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Eviden-
tiary Norms Embedded within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1324–37 (1998)
(discussing application of evidentiary rules to ADR process information exchanges).
35. For a description of the small claims process and its appeal system in California, see,
e.g., Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of
the Small Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 325–31 (2003).
36. See Sabatino, supra note 34, at 1334–35 (discussing confidentiality agreements used
in mediation).
37. See AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, BEYOND THE MYTHS: GET THE
FACTS ABOUT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 6 (2007). For a description of the control that mediation
promises participants over their ability to communicate, see Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning
Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionaliza-
tion?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2001).
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transformative mediation is not primarily concerned with either de-
termining with scientific precision what actually happened or
coming to an objective judgment about either the wrongdoer or
the wrong.38 Instead, it is primarily centered on repairing the rela-
tionship, using truth-telling and moral evaluation as useful methods
toward reconciliation or rapprochement, but not as ultimate
goals.39
To be sure, the creation of a parallel dispute resolution system,
managing its own defined causes of action through its own
processes, might seem a bold, even unnecessary move in a society
already overtaxed with government regulation and drop-of-a-hat lit-
igation. However, the modern American legal system leaves too
many injustices lingering without a remedy to justify dismissing the
promise of such a system without a thorough investigation. Of
course, this Article cannot investigate every concern about such a
significant innovation at length. Rather, its goal is to initiate a pub-
lic discussion on whether this is a valuable way forward for the
American justice system and how such a system might be
implemented.
II. SEEKING A MODEL FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION:
THE RISE OF THE EQUITY COURTS
There are enough similarities between the rise of the equity
courts and the advent of court-annexed mediation to suggest that a
mediation-only parallel system can be successful without further ex-
acerbating existing structural difficulties. Like modern mediation,
the equity courts evolved from the inability of the common law
courts to deliver justice in all cases, to fully name which cases
should be justiciable, and to consistently find an appropriately just
remedy.40
Scholars have located the first uses of equity in several different
ancient and medieval legal systems. Some historians credit the En-
glish for the first systemic use of equity and place the beginning of
that system in the thirteenth or fourteenth century.41 Others claim
38. See Michael Palmer, The Magic of Mediation, 22 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 18, 19 (1996).
39. See Welsh, supra note 37, at 18–20 (describing relational transformative possibilities
of mediation).
40. See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
41. See GEORGE GOLDSMITH, THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF EQUITY 6–7 (6th ed. 1871).
Goldsmith identifies the reign of Edward I (1239–1307) as the formative period of equity
jurisdiction. This book describes a key moment in the development of equity that resulted
from the assignment in the Statute of Westminster the Second of the power to the masters of
chancery to issue writs after they had decided that the complainant had no remedy at law.
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that equity has more ancient roots in Roman and German legal sys-
tems.42 The use of equity in England is known to have preceded the
Norman kings,43 suggesting that even ancients understood the fis-
sures between the rule of law and justice. Still other scholars trace
equity to its ecclesiastical roots, centered in theological and philo-
sophical attempts to justify “a departure from formal rights owing
to moral or other considerations.”44 Indeed, Lord Chancellor Cow-
per argued that “equity is no part of the law, but a moral virtue
which qualifies, moderates, and reforms the rigour, hardness, and
edge of the law, and is a universal truth.”45
English barrister George Goldsmith summarizes equity as  “in ac-
cordance with the principles of natural and universal justice,” as
“softening the asperities, supplying the deficiencies, guiding and as-
sisting the administration of positive law, and offering redress
where, from its nature, that law could give none.”46 Although the
However, Goldsmith argued that equitable jurisdiction as such was developed much later. Id.
at 6–7. Story argues that the jurisdiction of chancery was fully operational by the time Rich-
ard II reigned (1367–1400). JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 29
(W.E. Grigsby ed., 1884) (2006) (hereinafter STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE).
42. See, e.g., ELLIOT H. GOODWIN, THE EQUITY OF THE KING’S COURT BEFORE THE REIGN OF
EDWARD THE FIRST 10–12 (1899) (discussing the claim that equity comes from the Roman
aequitas, but noting the limited power of the Roman praetor to ignore positive law and argu-
ing for its roots in Teutonic and Carolingian processes); see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at
3 (discussing the Roman office of praetor, which judged “according to equity and con-
science, where a rigid adherence to the strict letter of the law would work a hardship or
injustice,” though Goldsmith notes that Rome did not have separate court systems); id. at xvii
(citing THOMAS LORD ELLESMERE, CERTAINE OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE OFFICE OF THE
LORD CHANCELLOR 2 (1651)).
43. GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 12–13 (noting the existence of equitable jurisdiction in
Anglo-Saxon England as well as by Norman dukes before the Norman conquest).
44. See ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY & TRUSTS 6–7, 11 (6th ed. 2009) (quoting GEORG WIL-
HELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 142 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1952) (1821)) (describing the origin of the equity courts as a mixture of ecclesiastical and
precedential law and noting the Greek roots of the idea); see also RALPH E. KURTZ, A SHORT
TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF A COURT OF EQUITY TO DIRECT ACTS BEYOND ITS JURISDICTION
26–27 (1917) (noting Pollock and Maitland’s argument that the chancery had its roots in the
early English church and that the “chancellor, as keeper of the conscience of the people,
could enforce his decrees by threats upon the religious life” of litigants); GOLDSMITH, supra
note 41, at xiv, xvi, 7–8, 13 (noting that the Roman office of chancellor passed to the Roman
Church, which adopted the office of chancellor to be the principal judge of a bishop’s consis-
tory, and that, until the right of Edgar, the chancellor was a clergyman because of his
literacy); STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 41, at 11 (noting that equity pleadings
were likely borrowed from both civil and canon law. He also argues that the ecclesiastical
lawyers welcomed the adoption of Roman civil law because of their interest in strengthening
their power over the laity).
45. Lord Dudley v. Lady Dudley, (1705) 24 Eng. Rep. 118 (Ch.), per Lord Cowper, LC.
46. GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at 2; see also id. at 18 (equity filled defects in the common
law “by introducing a jus honorarium” and taking cases “where no remedy, or an inadequate
remedy, was provided by law” (quoting GEORGE SPENCE, 1 THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT OF CHANCERY 324 (Lea & Blanchard 1846))); see J.J. PARK, WHAT ARE COURTS OF
EQUITY 17 (1832) (arguing with Joseph Story that the equity court has jurisdiction where
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parallels are inexact, what is known about the rise of equity permits
a comparison of the ways in which court-connected mediation can
perform a comparable systemic and ethical role.
A. Equity and Mediation: A Systemic Comparison
Equity and mediation are essentially powers reserved by the sov-
ereign in the common law system. In both equity and mediation,
the sovereign retains the power to permit disputants to seek justice
in a different way. Like mediation, equity power, once held largely
as ministerial, evolved to become a significant source of legal au-
thority to achieve justice. Furthermore, substantive and procedural
rules in the equity courts became increasingly complex and certain,
just as procedural rules have become in mediation.47 As a system
priding itself on the ability to be flexible and to consider context
and persons in the delivery of justice, equity still had to contend
with the criticism that it was pregnant with abusive power because it
could subvert rule of law values, such as the uniform application of
the law, certainty, and predictability.48 However, the system of eq-
uity found ways to balance this potentially all-embracing power by
restricting its own jurisdiction.49
As I will discuss at more length, the concern that mediation
might overtake and damage common law values if mediation be-
comes a parallel system of justice echoes the concerns once
expressed about equity. However, court-annexed mediation stands
in a much different position vis-à-vis common law authority and em-
bodies both practices and values that guard against concerns that it
might subvert fundamental common law values and procedures.
Even though equity is now considered an adjunct to law, it is im-
portant to recall that it was once the opposite. The common law was
understood to be a delegated power of the King, who reserved all
other powers of doing justice to himself, including the power to
overrule the judges.50 During the reign of Henry II, when localized,
there is no “plain, adequate and complete remedy” at law, e.g., the remedy must not be
“doubtful and obscure.” It must not “fall short of what the party is entitled to,” and it “must
reach the whole mischief, and secure the whole right of the party, now and for the future.”);
STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 41, at 7.
47. See infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
50. GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at 22 (describing Henry II’s reservation of legal power “as
the fountain of justice and equity”); GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 18, 23 (noting that by the
time of Edward I, the King swore an oath to be the source of both justice and equity and
functioned as the court of last appeal, delegating the power to do justice while reserving the
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discretionary justice began to develop into a law that was “common”
to the kingdom, the King reserved the right to overrule the devel-
oping “rule of law” system for any reasons he saw fit.51 William
Holdsworth’s discussion of the creation of the King’s courts sug-
gests that, although the King’s justice was not always just—it could
be dispensed arbitrarily to favor his friends and harm his ene-
mies52—its partiality was no different from the preferential
treatment shown by his delegated jurists in the early years of the
common law system.53 In fact, the King’s justice was apparently the
“least worst” form of justice available, if lack of bias toward one’s
friends and prejudice against one’s enemies54 are the measure of a
fair judicial system. Furthermore, there is at least some evidence
that part of the role of equity was to alleviate the harshness of the
law in cases where poverty made strict exercise of the law unjust.55
Moreover, there have always been philosophical reasons for the
sovereign to retain the ultimate power to rule and overrule ap-
pointed judges. As with any law that becomes “common” and
attempts to enforce uniform obligations and protections for all af-
ter centuries of ad hoc justice, the English common law could not
fully resolve the ancient difficulties attending legal systems that as-
pire to both justice and the rule of law. How can a law be fairly
applied to two persons who stand in somewhat different situations?
What must be done when formal justice and formal equality fail to
right to do “ordinary justice” himself); 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
194–95 (Methuen & Co. 6th ed. 1938) (1903) (noting that the King had significant control
over what business would come before the court). But see GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 55–56
(noting that by 1305, petitioners are requesting equity against the King from Parliament,
although many of those petitions are referred to the King’s administrators, such as chancery,
with the directive that they should do justice, or the petitioners are being sent to seek com-
mon law remedies). This development, Goodwin argues, is the first reference to the equity
jurisdiction of the chancery, though other accounts do not connect the chancellor with this
period. Id. at 57.
51. See HUDSON, supra note 44, at 15 (noting Henry II’s preservation of the right to
petition the King even after creation of a common law for the entire realm to be adminis-
tered by the King’s Bench courts).
52. Id. at 32–33, 35–36 (noting that, before Henry II’s reforms, the King’s justice was
obtained by payment, and his protection of the weak against the powerful was exercised
arbitrarily for those who could pay for the privilege).
53. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 194–95. But see GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 21, 24
(noting that the King often used his power to interfere and alter either procedure or judg-
ment arbitrarily but suggesting that some of that abuse was kept in check by protests from
members of the House of Commons, e.g., about the overuse of pardons).
54. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 194–95.
55. GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 31–32 (noting that fines imposed by the pipe rolls were
sometimes remitted or reduced in case of poverty and that pardons were given in some cases
for paupers who owed fines).
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call forth an equitable result?56 What is the duty of the sovereign
when “‘the strictest right is the greatest wrong’ (summum jus summa
injuria)” and when litigants insist on standing on the law even when
they are aware that their assertion of right will cause injury to
others?57 Even in early times, the need to ensure against the oppres-
sion of court officers was noted.58
On first glance, the notion that justice ultimately comes from the
sovereign who retains the right to achieve it, and not from the sov-
ereign’s authorized procedures or officials, may not seem to find
any obvious parallel in the modern mediation movement. Nor
might court-connected mediation seem to resemble equity as the
stroke of true justice the sovereign decrees, a stroke that up-ends
and disrupts the pedestrian and flawed justice offered by the institu-
tional rule of law.
Yet, from a broader perspective, the institutions of mediation
and restorative justice essentially argue that the true power for
resolving disputes and transforming conflict into understanding
and cooperation lies in the people themselves, both those in con-
flict and those who constitute the community around them. In this
way, mediation practice does not simply lie in the shadows of court
justice as a poor, efficient cousin of the true power, the common
law. Rather, it is the other way around. Individuals and their com-
munities, retaining the right to resolve disputes, have provided
limited authorization to the court systems and the common law to
carry out these tasks. It is the people, individually and collectively,
who reserve the power to do the justice that the modern common
law courts cannot achieve through alternative means, no matter
how much these processes may subvert common law processes and
remedies. That is, people may choose the courts’ justice, or they
may recognize that true justice cannot be done in the courts and
seek to exercise their original jurisdiction over their conflicts
through mediation and other ADR processes.
Equity and mediation have also developed similarly. Both began
as ad hoc informal processes and became more formal and power-
ful systems of dispute resolution. According to Blackstone, the
56. See HUDSON, supra note 44, at 6–7, 11 (discussing the difficulty of creating rules with-
out treating individuals in some cases unjustly and noting Aristotle’s similar argument for
why equity is superior justice).
57. IMMANUEL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 5 (W. Hastie trans., 2001) (1790). In The
Tricksy Word: Richard Weisberg on The Merchant of Venice, 23 L. & LITERATURE 71, 79 (2011),
Geoffrey Hartman refers to Kant’s maxim summum jus summa injuria as showing that “law, as a
limiting action, may itself come upon a limit, or have to be limited as it approaches, or even
as it is infected by, the violence or violation it seeks to curb.”).
58. GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 15.
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English system of equity evolved through the slow ascription of Ro-
man and ecclesiastical judicial powers to what were essentially
ministerial offices of secretaries and scribes until these became
stronger, and eventually the office of chancellor became very
powerful.59
In the same way, mediation has slowly evolved from an infre-
quently used, privatized dispute system into a procedural “referral
option” for frustrated litigants, and finally into an office of legal
power that has become part of the common law judge’s arsenal of
state control, at least in those jurisdictions that have adopted court-
annexed mediation.60 More colorfully, it is arguable that mediation
has found its voice, not as a poor but worthy cousin of the common
law courts, but as a “right hand” of the courts, the entrance to and
exit from which courts significantly control.
Historically, the sophistication and elaboration of rules in the sys-
tem of equity has increased as it has evolved, a trajectory that finds
some parallels in court-annexed mediation. Equity developed from
a somewhat happenstance series of informal pleas to the King’s jus-
tice61 into a sophisticated dispute system in the High Court of
Chancery, requiring appropriate pleadings and sporting dual juris-
dictions by overlapping with the common law system.62 In England,
until the merger of the equity and common law courts in 1873,63
cases in the ordinary jurisdiction of the equity courts were resolved
through common and statutory law, while those in its extraordinary
jurisdiction were resolved according to the developed rules and
maxims of equity.64 Similarly, ADR theoreticians and practitioners,
59. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at xiv (noting that the name “chancellor” meant
scribe or secretary in the Roman courts, though the office later assumed both judicial and
supervisory powers); 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 395 (noting that the Chancery was
essentially a secretariat under the Norman and Angevin Kings, and the chancellor essentially
served as a prime minister for the Curia Regis, the governing entity).
60. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 37, at 64–68 (describing ways in which judges are involved
in coercing settlement in court-annexed mediation cases).
61. See, e.g., GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 15–16, 18 (describing the change to a system of
justice where a litigant must first go to the ordinary courts before applying to the King, while
preserving the right to apply to the King).
62. GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at 30–34 (showing the development of equity jurisdiction
and the ways that equity and common law competed and ultimately settled on their compet-
ing jurisdiction).
63. HUDSON, supra note 44, at 17 (stating that the two systems were separate until the
year of 1873).
64. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at 1–2 (discussing the development and ultimate pur-
pose of equity). But see GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 59–60 (noting that at the time of Henry V,
the chancellor had only extraordinary jurisdiction). The “ordinary” jurisdiction of the equity
courts extends to those cases where the common law rules are applied, and the “extraordi-
nary” jurisdiction extends to cases where equitable rules are applied. See, e.g., JOHN DOWNEY
WORKS, COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION: A TREATISE ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF
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particularly in court-annexed and court-enforced mediation, have
focused on a sophisticated refinement of mediation processes, in-
cluding the innovation of remedies, as well as the development of
ethical rules and parameters around the enforcement of mediation
agreements.65 Indeed, there is now such a robust “law of mediation”
that the recently published treatise on mediation law by Professor
James Coben and his co-authors ran through three volumes and
3,600 pages.66
One difference between the equity courts and court-annexed me-
diation is that equity courts have developed a substantive
dimension. The equity court has been described both as a “reser-
voir of general principles” to achieve fairness and as a “code of
technical substantive rules of law.”67 Court-annexed mediation
should follow a similar trajectory into creating substantive legal
rules that give rise to mediation-only causes of action. Legislatures
and courts should create a “substantive law” of claims referable to
mandatory mediation, even if they are not justiciable in court. That
menu of cases should include traditional legal disputes that have
proven amenable to more efficient resolution through ADR, such
as commercial disputes, and cases, such as divorce, where process
dynamics of mediation are essential to preserving important ongo-
ing relationships. However, perhaps most importantly, that menu
should include cases that should be, but are not currently, “actiona-
ble,” in which mandatory mediation could be ordered by the courts
even where no other legal remedy was available. Whether the “law
of mediation” will develop substantive values and principles in the
same way as equity has developed its maxims remains to be seen,
but this is a development that should be welcomed, not stifled.
THE PRESENT DAY, HOW SUCH JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED, AND THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING AND
LOSING IT 25 (2nd ed. 1897).
65. See, e.g., Fran L. Tetunic, Florida Mediation Case Law: Two Decades of Maturation, 28
NOVA L. REV. 87, 90–111 (2003) (describing Florida’s extensive creation of rules of practice
and ethics for mediations); A.B.A., AM. ARB. ASS’N. & ASS’N. FOR CONFLICT RESOL., MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute_resolution/model_standards_conduct_april2007.
authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
66. See JAMES R. COBEN ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE (2012–2013 Trial
Practice Series).
67. HUDSON, supra note 44, at 6 (noting that equity can be understood as the means to
ensure that strict application of the law did not result in unfairness, as a collection of substan-
tive principles developed by equity courts to judge people’s consciences, or as a set of
procedural rules and forms developed by the Chancery courts); see also PARK, supra note 46, at
11–12 (claiming that equity has gone beyond “discretionary interference, wherever the law
was harsh or silent,” to have rules that are “fixed laws in themselves, sometimes supplying,
sometimes controlling . . . the institutions of common and statute law”).
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B. Avoiding Equity’s Stumbles
One concern that mediation advocates may have about using the
equity courts as a model for the development of a viable court-an-
nexed mediation system stems from the fact that equity courts
became a rigid system that adopted (and arguably exacerbated
some of) the flaws of the common law courts.68 This is a develop-
ment most mediation advocates would find disappointing.69 On the
other side, those proposing caution in the expansion of mediation,
particularly the use of mandatory mediation, have emphasized its
failure to be beholden to the values of the rule of law and the pro-
tections of the current system of adjudication, including the
protection that lawyers provide to clients.70 As the most prominent
example, mediation theorists and women’s advocates have argued
for years over whether justice is possible in a mediation setting
where one party has abused his power over the other.71
These conflicting challenges raise the question whether any sys-
tem designed to bring justice outside of the constraints of a rule of
law regime must and should be cabined lest it abuse its power.  Yet,
imposing typical rule of law constraints on new systems to cabin that
68. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS THEREOF
10 (1857) (hereinafter STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS) (describing equity as “a science of great
complexity” requiring “great talents to master in all its various distinctions and subtle
contrivances”).
69. See, e.g., Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR—A Time of Crisis, A Time of Change, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 993, 1002 (2012) (noting intention of mediation proponents to create a volun-
tary and informal process designed to empower parties to explore the resolution of their
disputes on their own terms rather than within the existing adversarial and legally rigid for-
mal process); Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation—
Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial
Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 513, 550 (2004) (noting that the mediation com-
munity has successfully advocated ADR “in order to maximize individual choice, creativity,
flexibility, and of course, finality” and that it is “odd” when mediators argue for “bright-line,
legalistic rules to remedy problems created in a process heralded because of its focus on self-
determination”).
70. Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 146–47 (2005)
(noting the critique that court proceedings protect party equality of status by incorporating
attorney representation that “maintains distance between the parties” and rules of procedure
and legal rights); see also Lerner v. Laufer, 819 A.2d 471, 482 (2003) (noting the clash be-
tween mediation values and values of adversarial proceedings “by parties represented by fully
independent and empowered attorneys” who seek to vindicate “established rights and duties”
under law).
71. See, e.g., Boyarin, supra note 69, at 1010 (noting risk of coercion when mediation is
used, “such as when particular types of domestic violence are involved”); AM. BAR ASS’N,
SECTION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 37, at 11 (describing dispute about use of medi-
ation in domestic violence situations); ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION; RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
22–23 (1994).
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power can easily lead to the very difficulties that gave rise to the
need for equity courts.
Some legal historians have argued that equity’s development of
rigid forms of pleadings and processes, which narrowed the types of
conflicts the system could consider, eventually swept away the values
that equity brought to the table, such as flexibility and fairness.72 In
English lawyer James Humphreys’s words, equity became simply a
rival to the common law; it became Positive Law, acting and bound
by fixed rules “[that had] long lost its original character of discre-
tionary interference, wherever the law was harsh or silent. . . . [I]ts
rules have become fixed laws in themselves, sometimes supplying,
sometimes controlling, as occasion or accident may have directed,
the institutions of common and statute law.”73
Others argue that the normative debate over the place of eq-
uity—whether it should continue to utilize “judicial discretion and
natural law”74 or whether it should “embrac[e] a more formal and
‘legal’ conception of equity based on strict procedural rules and
stare decisis”75—continued well past the adoption of formalities in
the equity courts.76 For example, Professor Kroger argues that these
debates continued into the eighteenth century in the United
States.77 To be sure, the early Marshall Court first veered in the di-
rection of rigid substantive rules and formal principles like the
English system of equity.78 Kroger argues, though, that under Jus-
tice Marshall, the Court restored the traditional, moral
72. See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 44, at 19 (describing different causes of action and
remedies between common law and equity); John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835,
and the History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1438 (1998) (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 822–24 (1877) (describing equity as
“a labored connected system, governed by established rules, and bound down by prece-
dents,” and calling for a merger of law and equity so the rules were the same, lest they “cease
to be courts of justice”)).
73. PARK, supra note 46, at 11–12 (quoting JAMES HUMPHREYS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE
ACTUAL STATE OF ENGLISH LAWS OF REAL PROPERTY 198 (2d ed. 1827)).
74. Kroger, supra note 72, at 1433–34 (noting the traditionalist view that natural law was
the proper source of rules, that precedents were not important because equity was a universal
truth, and that equity was unbridled justice).
75. Id. at 1436–37 (describing the eighteenth century move of the English chancellors
to “‘legalize’ equity by standardizing procedure and adopting stare decisis in place of discre-
tionary and natural law-based adjudication”).
76. See id. at 1433.
77. Id. at 1430–31.
78. Id. at 1447 (arguing that the early Marshall court, from 1801 to 1820, adopted a
“modern or Blackstonian [equity jurisprudence], typified by strict application of stare decisis,
formal procedure, and strict construction of legal texts” as well as the “triumph of notions of
judicial duty over concerns about substantive justice”).
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understanding of equity in its early nineteenth century jurispru-
dence, using language such as “justice,” “equity,” and “honor,”
previously abandoned by the Court, to explain its decisions.79
These concerns about the increasingly rigid and complicated
processes of equity may be correct, but in some senses, the reality
that the ultimate power, such as was exercised by equity, must be
somewhat cabined in any system founded on the rule of law dictates
some formalization of any system calling itself legal. Common law
lawyers have expressed these concerns about equity throughout its
history.80 John Selden claimed “equity is a Roguish thing: for Law
we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the
Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or nar-
rower, so is Equity.”81 Equity poses chaotic possibilities if it has the
absolute power to overrule law in those unforeseen and uncharted
circumstances where justice demands it. Otherwise, the modern
movement to the rule of law would be drowned in the sea of excep-
tions that equity might ostensibly give in recognition of the unique
contexts that each set of litigants presents before the decision-
maker.
In point of historical fact, the parallel system of equity and its
potential for abusing power and upending the predictability of the
common law ended up being cabined in two ways. First, equity was
treated as a last resort for justice and only used when the applica-
tion of the law “shocked the conscience.”82 Merely inadvertent
injustices served up by the common law courts had to be accepted
by those in conflict as the price of the rule of law.83 Second, the law
of equity developed its own forms and causes of action so that the
79. Id. at 1459, 1461 (discussing the abandonment of these concepts in the early period
and arguing that during the later Marshall Court years, 1820 to 1835, equitable discretion
“made a startling comeback” to join precedent as an important source of rules, including
“highly subjective concepts like ‘the spirit’ of laws, ‘the sanction of public policy,’ ‘con-
science,’ ‘the equity of the case’ . . . ‘gross injustice,’ [and] ‘moral obligation’”).
80. See id. at 1436.
81. Id. (quoting JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 148–49 (3rd ed. 1860));
see also HUDSON, supra note 44, at 8 (noting that “certainty is the hallmark of every effective
legal system, but it is also true to say that chaos and complexity are the common characteris-
tic of every problem which confronts such a legal system”).
82. See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 44, at 13 (noting that equity did not ensure that no loss
was suffered but rather that ordinary people would not be harmed by fraud, undue influ-
ence, etc.); Joseph R. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 YALE L.J. 115
(1923) (noting that equity was limited in granting relief for a pure mistake of law and that it
did not enforce personal rights where no property rights were involved); cf. STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 41, at 2–3 (noting that earlier English and American laws’ use of
equity did not address all wrongs, leaving them instead to the conscience of the parties).
83. See, e.g., STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 41, at 3, 5, 437 (1884) (specifically
noting that an injunctive remedy in a partnership case will only be given for “studied delay
and omissions”).
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nature of the conflict ultimately limited the equity court’s jurisdic-
tion. For instance, trusts went to equity courts while real property
disputes went to the law courts or to the “ordinary,” common law-
governed jurisdiction of Chancery.84
The potentially vast power of the mediation movement has been
cabined by a different set of constraints. First, mediation has been
treated as an “annexation” to the court system rather than a parallel
and potentially more powerful challenger. In theory, a court-or-
dered mediation can subvert both substantive rules of law and legal
processes if the parties agree to the change. Occasionally in prac-
tice,85 however, at least some courts seem to believe that they have a
retained power to overturn any mediation agreements that are
strongly inconsistent with outcomes the law would provide. 86 Thus,
the showdown between the equity courts and the common law
courts, which was “won” by equity, is not likely to occur between the
common law and mandatory mediation in the near future.
Second, the most widely utilized ADR processes are consensual.
Even if a court may order parties into mediation, it may not order
that the mediation be successfully concluded or arrive at a particu-
lar result,87 though it may signal to mediators and parties that the
court has a preference for a certain outcome.88 Thus, the required
willingness of the parties to utilize mediation processes and consent
to their result has, to a large extent, constrained any inappropriate
power-grab by the mediation movement over the parties who use
mediation.  In the legal system, power tends to be more balanced
among the parties if each bears the costs of failure as well as the
promise of success. In traditional litigation, the plaintiff bears a
good share of the upfront costs (sometimes deterring him from
84. See, e.g., HAROLD POTTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF EQUITY AND ITS
COURTS 18 (describing the substantive cases that gave jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery
before the mid-seventeenth century); STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, supra note 68, at 266 (noting
the equity courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over some trusts); STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 41, at 5–6 (describing the different causes of action and remedies available); cf.
GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at xviii (noting the assignment of jurisdiction to equity of bank-
ruptcies and the persons and estates of mentally incompetent persons).
85. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 412–16 (discussing judicial perceptions of
mediations that do not achieve results expected under law).
86. See Peter Robinson, Centuries of Contract Common Law Can’t Be all Wrong: Why the
UMA’s Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement Proceedings Should be Embraced and
Broadened, 2003 J. Disp. Res. 135, 156–57 (discussing cases where mediation agreements have
been overturned on public policy grounds, such as violation of the law, ends contrary to the
public good, or the surrender of important legal rights).
87. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 408 (describing the mandatory consideration
rule in Minnesota and how the rule does not mandate an outcome or mediation at all); AM.
BAR ASS’N, SECTION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 37, at 4 (noting that mediation per-
mits self-determination rather than judge or jury-imposed solutions).
88. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 408.
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pursuing a remedy) as compared with the defendant or adjudica-
tor. By contrast, in a fixed-fee mediation, the plaintiff may split
mediation costs with the defendant, giving both the incentive to
proceed to a just and shared outcome, and the mediator has every
incentive to help them do so.89
Third, the values of the mediation movement work to correct the
tendency of mediation professionals to reallocate legal power from
the courts to themselves.90 The mediation movement was founded
to be an alternative to court processes, and the values of autonomy,
consent, and collaboration that it embraces91 make it less likely to
become a rival to the existing court systems for their legal authority.
To be sure, mediation theorists like Joseph Folger and Robert Bush
have argued that mediators who focus primarily on settlement may
be tempted to hijack mediations from the parties by pressuring
them to accept agreements that will close cases or mimic likely
court decisions.92 However, even accepting that this problem may
occur, the dispersal of legal power among the many available
mediators, in addition to party choice of mediators, suggests that
the mediation industry will not consolidate enough power to pose a
significant political threat to the common law courts.
Fourth, although the research suggests that mediation generally
saves litigants money in the long run, at least if they are willing to
consider a reasonable settlement,93 the use of mediation is some-
what constrained by its visible out-of-pocket costs, since litigants pay
mediator fees.94 A litigant who brings a lawyer may pay both for the
89. See, e.g., Andrew K. Niebler, Getting the Most Out of Mediation: Toward a Theory of Opti-
mal Compensation for Mediators, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 184 (1999) (noting that once
mediation parties have paid the fee, they will “rationally devote their full attention and en-
ergy to healing their differences,” and the mediator “can ensure that the healing process
works to the maximum advantage of the parties, albeit within the economic constraints im-
posed by the mediator’s opportunity costs”).
90. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 37, at 94 (describing Florida’s rules mandating that
mediators not coerce a settlement).
91. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 401–03 (discussing proposals at the Pound
conference on which cases should be referred to mediation).
92. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 71, at 22–23 (noting the control and “broad strategic
power” mediators have over discussions between the parties and the mediation as a whole).
93. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 37, at 7 (noting
the low-cost expense of mediation as an alternative to litigation); Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to
the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25
HAMLINE L. REV. 401, 405 (noting that lawyers chose mediation because of cost-savings but
questioning the extent of savings).
94. But see Bobbi McAdoo, A Mediation Tune-Up for the State Court Appellate Machine, 2010
J. DISPUTE RES. 327, 363–64 (2010) (noting there have been mixed results in increasing the
rate of settlement in cases in which no fees were charged); see also Wayne D. Brazil, Should
Court-Sponsored ADR Survive? 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 252–53, 263 (2006) (noting
that private litigants pay substantial fees up to $10,000 a day, which suggests to mediators that
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lawyer’s time and the mediator’s. By contrast, the actual costs of a
seemingly free public justice system (except for the filing fee) may
not be as visible to litigants until late in many conflicts, perhaps
because of their optimism about succeeding in court. The upfront
cost in mediation may obviate the likelihood that litigants would
willingly flock to mediation in the numbers required to pose a chal-
lenge to the legal preeminence of the common law courts.
Finally, there has historically been some selection in the subject
matter for cases using mediation, not dissimilar to the subject mat-
ter limitations that found their way into equity jurisdiction.95
Although some jurisdictions have mandated mediation in a wide
variety of civil cases,96 most mandatory court-annexed mediation
has been limited to a few subject areas, such as family law or com-
mercial disputes.97 In this way, mediation has become a door in the
courthouse for subject-specific disputes in the same way that the
equity courts became the door for suits involving trusts, specific
kinds of real property transactions, and so forth.98
C. Equity and Mediation: Ethical Commonalities
Equity and mediation share important ethical dimensions that
suggest that mandatory mediation or a related restorative process
may be an appropriate substitute for cases involving demonstrated
injustice that cannot be adjudicated in a traditional court system for
constitutional or other reasons. As noted, one parallel can be found
in the function that both equity and mediation serve with respect to
their rival, the common law courts. These two systems of justice also
share some ethical commitments that bolster the case for a parallel
mandatory mediation system of justice. Even though court-annexed
their goal is to “get a deal,” and that Brazil urges court-connected mediation to be offered
free or at a reduced cost).
95. On the limitations on equitable subject matter jurisdiction, see supra notes 82–84
and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, The Court is in Session: What Judges Say about Court-
Ordered Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 377, 387 (2007) (noting that mediation is “a
routinely expected step for most civil litigation”); see also Nancy Welsh, supra note 37, at 23
(noting early court experiments with mediation in small claims, custody and visitation, and
finally in contract, personal injury, and employment cases).
97. See Nancy Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do
with It, 79 WASH U. L. Q. 787, 798 n.59, 809 (2001) (noting early use of mediation for family
and neighborhood disputes and citing a study showing that more than two-thirds of medi-
ated cases involved personal injury and contract disputes).
98. Cf. THOMAS E. SCRUTTON, THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN LAW ON THE LAW OF EN-
GLAND 156–59 (discussing Chancery jurisdiction over uses and trusts, mortgage redemption,
the law of infants, and mentally ill persons).
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mediation has become institutionalized authority, there is a deliber-
ate and necessary tension between mediation as practiced in recent
years in the United States and the common law court system, not
unlike that attending the battles for ascendancy between the law
and equity courts.99
Although both struggles certainly have involved some economic
and political aspects,100 there is a moral, and even ideological, as-
pect to the tension between law and equity or mediation as well.
Historically, the common law and equity courts challenged the
other as a moral force and criticized the other to check its abuse.101
In equity’s challenge to the common law, the image of the chancel-
lor as the “keeper of the king’s conscience”102 was used because
even the sovereign, from whom all justice flows, may be tempted to
respond unjustly to friends and enemies.103 He may even be
tempted to demand payment for justice.104 Thus, it is the chancel-
lor’s responsibility to challenge the sovereign to regain his moral
footings and do justice to the poor and powerless who cannot win
the King’s favor or the court’s ear with money or influence.105 As
Cowper put it, equity will:
assist the law where it is defective and weak in the constitu-
tion . . . and defends the law from crafty evasions, delusions,
and new subtleties, invested and contrived to evade and de-
lude the law . . . this is the office of equity, to support and
99. For a discussion of the struggle between the equity and common law courts, see
POTTER, supra note 84, at 4–5, 11–15.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., GOODWIN, supra note 42, at 15 (noting that from Anglo-Saxon times, the
King was perceived as “the guardian of justice and equity as against the ignorance and op-
pression of the presiding officers of the public courts” caused in part by the strictness of the
law or the influence of one of the parties); HUDSON, supra note 44, at 10 (discussing how the
Courts of Equity were often the “courts of conscience” with the Lord Chancellor being de-
scribed as the “keeper of monarch’s conscience”).
102. GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at 22 (describing the chancellor as the King’s primary
chaplain, confessor, and person who knows the King’s will better than anyone and who serves
as “the keeper of the king’s conscience”); see also id. at 23 (describing the chancellor as “the
mouth, the ear, the eye, and the very heart of the prince” (quoting THOMAS LORD ELLES-
MERE, CERTAINE OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE OFFICE OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR 21
(1651))).
103. See HUDSON, supra note 44, at 32–33, 35–36.
104. See Goodwin, supra note 42, at 33–34 (“[T]he king’s justice was mainly exercised for
the money it brought in to the royal treasury.”).
105. See A. H. MARSH, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY AND THE RISE AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITY 47–48 (1890) (describing equity as “the refuge of the
poor and afflicted . . . the altar and sanctuary for such as against the right of rich men and
the countenance of great men, cannot maintain the goodness of their cause and the truth of
their title” (quoting THOMAS LORD ELLESMERE, CERTAINE OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE OF-
FICE OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR 21 (1651))).
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protect the common law from shifts and crafty contrivances
against the justice of the law.106
Similarly, the rise of the modern ADR movement has posed a
prophetic challenge to the common law courts for their repeated
failure to achieve either justice or peace in many cases, or to free
themselves from the restrictions of limited remedies. Perhaps the
most poignant illustration of that challenge has been the flowering
of mediation to manage the difficult journey of divorce. In these
legal proceedings, commonly tempestuous and cruel, the common
law courts infamously and frequently have failed to achieve equita-
ble outcomes for families107 or to assist divorcing couples through
fierce conflict108 into truly cooperative future relationships. Court-
annexed mediation has offered a moral critique of both the law and
procedure of divorce and granted some temporary respite to di-
vorcing couples while divorce law slowly undergoes revision to
accommodate modern family formation and dissolution.109
Conversely, law has played an important role in challenging eq-
uity, as well as mediation. The image of justice as a blind goddess,
dispensing favors to the powerful and powerless, favored and disfa-
vored alike, has resonance in the tension between the common law
courts and both equity and the ADR movement. In equity, the bat-
tle is captured in the dispute between Lord Coke (for the law) and
Lord Ellesmere (for equity) during the reign of James I.110 Coke
invoked the right of Parliament to make and enforce the rule of
law, arguing that equity could not interfere with a legal ruling con-
sistent with Parliamentary law.111 Ellesmere claimed that when,
because of the “hard conscience of the party,” one litigant insisted
on his legal rights, the equity courts could enjoin him from enforc-
ing the judgment.112 Although Ellesmere’s views eventually gained
106. Hudson, supra note 44, at 14 (quoting Lord Dudley v. Lady Dudley, (1705) 24 Eng.
Rep. 118 (Ch.), per Lord Cowper, LC).
107. See, e.g., Penelope Bryan, “Collaborative Divorce”: Meaningful Reform or Another Quick
Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1001, 1005–10 (1999) (describing inequities of divorce on
women and children).
108. See, e.g., Yelena Ayrapetova, HB 004: Mandatory Divorce Mediation Program Passed in
Utah, 7 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 417 (2005) (describing “increasing court costs, delay, and escala-
tion of conflict” that come with divorce litigation).
109. For a discussion of a range of reform alternatives being considered, see Lynn War-
dle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783,
790 (1999).
110. See KURTZ, supra note 44, at 26.
111. More specifically, Coke claimed that when equity issued an injunction interfering
with a lawful decision, the party disobeying the injunction could not be imprisoned for violat-
ing it. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 461, 463.
112. See HUDSON, supra note 44, at 462.
382 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:2
the upper hand,113 the common law’s critique of the equity courts
for corrupt practices and dilatory justice114 eventually curbed the
jurisdiction of the chancellor. 115
In the development of court-annexed mediation practices, a
somewhat different dynamic has occurred. Although mediation set-
tlements have not gained the same authority to overrule the
common law that Lord Bacon succeeded in providing the equity
courts,116 they largely have become enforceable by law. That is true
even when the parties have created a settlement not obtainable at
the common law, or even one that countermands a result that the
common law likely might have ordered.117 Indeed, mediation is reg-
ularly praised for identifying creative solutions that provide more
justice “in fact” to the parties than the limited remedies of the law
may be made to give.118 Conversely, the law has challenged media-
tion by identifying mediation provisions that are so unjust or
violative of public policy that they should not be enforced by the
courts, such as failure of divorce mediations to award adequate
child support.119 In this way, mediation has challenged the ade-
quacy of the law, and law has been available to check putatively
113. David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700, 61 Ind. L.J. 539,
565–86 (1986) (describing the 1616–17 case in which the King upheld Lord Ellesmere’s
equitable intervention to block enforcement of a common law judgment and dismissed Lord
Coke’s indictment of Ellesmere and others for violation of the statute of Praemunire and
describing the growth of equity after that conflict).
114. Holdsworth discusses a number of corrupt practices in the Chancery facilitated by
life appointments. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 424–25. Staff members were paid by fees
from the business done and positions in the Chancery were sold or given to friends. Id.
Deputies concealed and kept some of the fees they received or sought bribes. Lawsuits in
equity often lasted many more years than common law actions, up to twenty years, unless
money was paid to expedite them. Id. at 426. Staff made money by copying documents as
required by court practice, and many of the chancellors were incompetent to settle what the
procedures of the courts should be. Id. at 426–28. With such significant discretion and little
supervision, abuses in the use of the equity court’s lavish discretion abounded. Id.; see also
POTTER, supra note 84, at 19–20 (discussing the abuses of equity officials and inadequacy of
their staff until Lord Eldon’s chancellorship).
115. For a brief history of this development, see PHILLIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL
DUTY 124 (2008); cf. POTTER, supra note 84, at 19–20.
116. For a history of the outcome of this conflict between the equity and law judges, see
Raack, supra note 113, at 574–83 (1986); see also 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 464.
117. For example, in Illinois during the 1980s, maintenance could not be awarded to a
divorcing spouse if said spouse had enough property and income “to satisfy his or her reason-
able needs.” Miles Beerman & Howard London, Rehabilitative Maintenance in Illinois 75 Ill. B.J.
658 (1987). However, such an award could be agreed upon in a mediation.
118. See, e.g., Rebecca Golbert, The Global Dimension of the Current Economic Crisis and the
Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 11 NEV. L.J. 502, 509 (2001).
119. See, e.g., James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at
Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 80–87 (2006) (discussing cases in which
mediation agreements were not enforced because of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake,
or unconscionability).
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abusive practices that occur in mediation settings, whether proce-
dural or substantive.
Beyond this mutual checking dynamic between the common law
and equity/mediation, there are some similarities between the two
systems’ ethical values governing the process and outcomes of con-
flict resolution. Historians of equity have attempted to describe the
animating principles that informed the law of equity as a “form of
natural justice.”120 As practiced, however, the interpersonal dy-
namic in equity is quite different than in the common law.
Although equity is routinely described as a response coming from
“the conscience of the King,”121 equity has performed a role distinct
from the particular religious understanding that was employed by
the Lord Chancellors in these early years.122 The scholastics, follow-
ing Aristotle and Aquinas, understood the conscience as something
within the intellectual or rational part of man’s nature, a “remnant
of [his] original uncorrupted nature.”123 In their terms, the synter-
esis of the King’s conscience held the moral precepts that guide
human wellbeing,124 most commonly stated as the principle that we
must do good, and not harm, to others. The workings of practical
reasoning, or the syneidesis, helped the King or his chancellor to use
those premises to make a moral judgment on actions of the litigants
before him and to determine how his power should be employed to
do justice.125 As so understood, the conscience would instruct the
King about the fair result he was morally bound to deliver, even
though an uncaring or stubborn monarch could dissent from the
conscience in favor of evil.126
That said, equity in the early days evidenced a complex dynamic
sounding more in Emmanuel Levinas’s profound description of
120. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at 2 (describing equity as a system of natural justice
based on the principles underlying its creation); see also HUDSON, supra note 44, at 6 (arguing
the same point as Goldsmith and referring to equity as “a form of natural justice”).
121. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at 10.
122. Id. (noting the religious understanding of the idea that equity courts were the keep-
ers of the King’s or Queen’s conscience, employed by the bishops who served as chancellors).
123. See MICHAEL BAYLOR, ACTION AND PERSON: CONSCIENCE IN LATE SCHOLASTICISM AND
THE YOUNG LUTHER 47–49, 130–31 (1977). Holdsworth suggests that this was the prevailing
understanding of the nature of conscience, as evidenced in St. Germain’s dialogue between a
doctor of canon law and student of the common law. WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, ESSAYS IN LAW
AND HISTORY 190–91 (A. L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1995).
124. BAYLOR, supra note 123, at 131–32, 134–35; see also CHARLES E. CURRAN, Conscience in
the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition, in CONSCIENCE 6–7, 25–27 (Charles Curran ed., 2004)
(discussing synderesis as human awareness of personal responsibility and syneidesis as the effort
to make judgments).
125. BAYLOR, supra note 123, at 131.
126. Id.
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ethical reality than the abstract reasoning in the medieval world de-
scribed as “conscience.”127 The dynamic of early equity is
interpersonal and asymmetrical, not abstract and logical.128 For
Levinas, the “moment of conscience” is not the moment when the
monarch deductively applies moral principles “found in nature,”
using his conscience to solve a specific problem placed before him.
Rather, the “moment of conscience” is that every-moment when the
Other stands over us in his need and his infinity, demanding our
response.129 In Levinas’s words, “Conscience welcomes the Other.
To welcome the Other is to put in question my freedom.”130 For
Levinas, it is the face of the Other that forces justice by calling me
to responsibility to that Other; it is that call that makes reasoning
about justice possible, rather than reason that makes the Other and
his situation intelligible to the decision-maker through
deduction.131
Likewise, in equity, it is the call of those in front of the King and
the demand they make for justice in their vulnerability before him
that he cannot resist. He appears to stand over them. In fact, in
calling out to his conscience, they stand over him. For Levinas, it is
this reality of conscience that throws aside the moral reasoning of
the common law resembling the interplay of synteresis and syneidesis.
Equity overcomes law because of the face-to-face interaction and
the demand of the Other that the King cannot stifle, cabin, or
resist.
Since the key ingredients of equity are interpersonal and asym-
metrical, the key maxims of equity are arguably nonsensical from a
common law perspective in much the same way that mediation, par-
ticularly transformative mediation,132 is nonsensical from a
common law perspective. Both processes up-end the deductive and
inductive, logical, and analogical speculations of the common law
127. See generally EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY
(1969).
128. Indeed, one of the key maxims of equity is that equity acts in personam and not in rem.
KURTZ, supra note 44, at 28; HUDSON, supra note 44, at 8. Kurtz suggests that this rule comes
from the fact that the chancellor adopted the ecclesiastical court model, and these courts
had no jurisdiction over property, but only religious punishments such as excommunication.
KURTZ, supra note 44, at 30–31. But see Long, supra note 82, at 115 (arguing that equity had
not sufficiently protected personal rights).
129. LEVINAS, supra note 127, at 83. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 41, at 26 (describing the
equity jurisdiction as originating in cases of oppression where the rank or position of the
wrongdoer was an obstacle to getting justice in ordinary courts, whereas the Privy Council
took up the cause of the poor “for God and in work of charity”).
130. Id. at 84–85.
131. Id. at 201–04.
132. For general discussions of the differences between transformative and other styles of
mediation, see generally BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 71, at 15–32.
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about justice. Examining just a few of equity’s core maxims gives
some sense of how radical equity truly is. Among the most famous
equitable maxims are “he who seeks equity must do equity” and “he
who comes to equity must come with clean hands.”133 Like media-
tion, both of these maxims expand the legal understanding of a
conflict from its narrow focus on delineating a right in one party,
which is breached by violation of a concomitant duty in another.
Rather, conflict as understood by both equity and transformative
mediation embraces the entire situation of the parties and their cir-
cles of relationship134 with a more global vision of right, demand,
and need than the common law is prepared to recognize.
In both equity and mediation, the relationship between the con-
flicting parties is the paramount claim that calls for a litigant’s
response, not the act of violation or even the damage done. The
equity court insists that a rights-holder must embrace and respond
ethically to the need and situation of his neighbor before he asks
the equity court to do the same for him.135 Mediation often simi-
larly insists that each party hear the other side’s story before the
parties move to identifying concerns or options for resolution.136
Indeed, in transformative mediation, the parties are required to be
physically present because it is the encounter of each with the other
that makes transformation possible.137
To describe this critical aspect of mediation concretely, Bush and
Folger have identified two key dynamics in successful transforma-
tive mediations. First, the subject moves from being fearful,
confused, and feeling “vulnerable and out of control” to being em-
powered.138 She understands what matters to her, what her options
are, and that she has choices about what to do, which she deliber-
ately makes after a full assessment of her situation and her
133. HUDSON, supra note 44, at 24, 26–27.
134. Id. at 26–27 (noting the fact “that a claimant will not receive the court’s support
unless she has acted entirely fairly herself”).
135. Id. (noting that no remedy will issue unless the claimant has acted equitably).
136. See Jessica Stepp, How Does the Mediation Process Work?, MEDIATE.COM (Feb. 2003),
http://www.mediate.com/articles/steppj.cfm (“After the opening statement, the mediator
will give each side the opportunity to tell their story uninterrupted. Most often, the person
who requested the mediation session will go first. The statement is not necessarily a recital of
the facts, but it is to give the parties an opportunity to frame issues in their own mind, and to
give the mediator more information on the emotional state of each party.”).
137. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 71, at 81–85 (discussing the way in which transforma-
tive mediation works through the objectives and outcomes desired by mediation); see also
McAdoo et al., supra note 34, at 10 (noting that litigants who are not present during media-
tion regard the process as less fair than those who are, though the allocation of responsibility
between lawyer and client does not affect client views about fairness).
138. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 71, at 85; see also PRANIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 48–49
(noting how conflict can cause deep fissures and hurtful strategies).
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opponent’s.139 However, in transformative mediation, a second dy-
namic reminiscent of Levinas’s face-to-face encounter occurs: if the
mediation is successful, each party recognizes that he can under-
stand and reflect upon the situation of the other and not just his
own.140 Each party gains the capacity to care about seeing his oppo-
nent’s perspective and acknowledging it, making accommodations
in his position when possible to respond to the opponent’s need.141
As restorative justice planner Kay Pranis has argued, this encounter
may be essential to change since “[f]ew can recover from trauma,
take risks, or develop new behavior patterns without caring, sup-
portive relationships.”142
Two other maxims provide examples of the similar ethical per-
spectives of equity and mediation: “equity looks to the intent rather
than to the form” and “equity imputes an intention to fulfill an obli-
gation.”143 These maxims suggest that the equity courts will not just
make an empirical inquiry into what the actual intentions of previ-
ously engaged parties were with respect to the transaction that has
birthed a conflict. Rather, the equity court will implicitly assume
(like a legal fiction) that the parties mean in good faith to do what
they bound themselves morally to do, even if that same outward
form and the circumstances of the conflict do not seem to substan-
tiate an actual good faith willingness to keep faith with the other
party.144 Although these maxims can be seen as logical syllogisms, a
more faithful way to understand them is as equity’s call to the con-
science to actually look at the need of the Other and Her call for
just treatment, and even Her refusal to take “no” for an answer to
this call.145
139. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 71, at 90 (describing recognition in mediation).
140. Id. at 90–91 (describing the process of giving recognition in thought).
141. Id. at 91–92.
142. PRANIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 170.
143. HUDSON, supra note 44, at 24.
144. Id. at 13, 28 (noting that the courts would require the defendant to act in good
conscience, either to refrain from exercising a right or giving a right to the plaintiff, and that
the courts would give effect to the substance, not the surface of a transaction, and the as-
sumption that a person bound by an obligation will carry it out). Hudson also notes the
related principle that “equity looks on as done that which ought to have been done.” Id. at
28.
145. One can find parallels to this Levinasan view of the relationship between the oppres-
sor and the one who calls to him in need in the equity authors’ focus on the oppressor’s lack
of conscience toward the one who calls to him in need. For example, Holdsworth describes
Lord Ellesmere’s argument that when a judgment has been obtained at law by “oppression,
wrong and a hard conscience,” Earl of Oxford’s Case, (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485 (Ch.) 487, the
chancellor will set it aside, not because of a legal defect, “ ‘but for the hard conscience of the
party.’” 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 462 (quoting Earl of Oxford’s Case, 21 Eng. Rep. at
487).
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In transformative mediation processes, mediation similarly aims
for a deeper justice than the common law can give. Transformative
mediation assumes that individual responses to conflict can be
transformed from self-interested, fearful attempts to gain resources
or power at the expense of the other person into genuine exper-
iences of mutual understanding and affirmation.146 Transformative
mediation assumes that when the immediate threat of the conflict is
stripped away by story-telling, which paradoxically empowers
through the vulnerability of the story,147 the parties will rediscover
their innate desire to do justice to and for the other, rather than to
stand on their legal rights.148 Even when circumstances do not per-
mit a party in transformative mediation to accommodate the other
party’s needs, the mediation process is designed to produce re-
spectful acknowledgement both of the dignity of the opponent and
the difficulties he has encountered that have contributed to creat-
ing the conflict being mediated.149
A survey of the practices of equity and mediation reveals other
similarities. The first similarity is what both systems claim as their
“flexibility,” which might also be described as “creativity.”150
Neither, at least in theory, is bound to rigid rules or solutions. Both
permit the decision-maker—which in the case of mediation is the
parties—to craft a solution that either permits both parties to pro-
tect their interests or balances and accommodates them in creative
ways that the law has not been able to offer.151
Second, both equity and mediation, at least in its transformative
version, attempt not only retroactive but also forward-looking relief,
although in very different ways. The primary momentum of the
common law is backward looking. Civil causes of action attempt to
establish past rights or wrongdoing and award money to compen-
sate for any breach of rights. In a similar way, criminal actions at the
146. BUSH AND FOLGER, supra note 71, at 89–90.
147. See, e.g., Amy Cohen, Debating the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and
Practice in Nepal, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 295, 343 (2006) (“[I]t is precisely this (arguably
modern) process of speaking—of making interior representations on behalf of one’s self in
public and cognizable terms—that female participants here collectively find empowering.”)
148. BUSH AND FOLGER, supra note 71, at 90–91.
149. Id. at 91.
150. See HUDSON, supra note 44, at 8 (arguing for the importance of flexibility in equity so
that the law can keep up with social developments); BUSH AND FOLGER, supra note 71, at 16
(describing the “satisfaction story” of mediation as including flexibility that “can . . . produce
creative, ‘win-win’ outcomes that reach beyond formal rights to solve problems and satisfy
parties’ genuine needs in a particular situation”).
151. See HUDSON, supra note 44, at 5 (“Equity is the means by which a system of law bal-
ances out the need for certainty . . . with the need to achieve fair results in individual
circumstances.”); BUSH AND FOLGER, supra note 71, at 16 (describing “win-win” solutions that
meet parties’ needs).
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common law have a retributive focus. The purpose of criminal sanc-
tions is law-regulated revenge, or, in some theories, righting a lost
balance by punishing the criminal in appropriate proportion to the
crime he has committed.152
In equity, by contrast, the declarative judgment and the injunc-
tion—the most important remedies available—attempt to govern
the relationship of the litigants in the present and the future.153
Similarly, the focus of transformative mediation is present and fu-
ture-oriented. The primary focus of transformative mediation is not
on identifying appropriate financial compensation for lost harm,
but on empowering a litigant to understand her situation and goals
and to choose a solution that speaks to those goals154 while also
helping her to reach out to her opponent in understanding and to
accommodate the opponent’s needs.155 The hope of transformative
mediation is that, going forward, each person will have gained the
compassion and willingness to make her opponent’s concerns part
of her own.156
In this way, the forward-looking impetus of transformative media-
tion is distinct from that in equity. Equity declares that one litigant
has the right and the other has the duty. It enforces compliance
with that declaration through contempt of court if an injunction is
not followed or further litigation if declaratory relief is ignored.
Transformative mediation, by contrast, relies on the insight and
willingness of the parties to comply with their own promises and to
follow through on the compassion and respect achieved in the me-
diation with caring actions toward the other party.157
152. See PARK, supra note 46, at 24 (arguing that equity courts have administrative, declar-
atory, and protective jurisprudence, while law courts are “principally courts of resolutory and
retributive jurisprudence”); see also Vogel, supra note 9, at 566 (“[R]estorative justice shares
with retributive justice the concern with making right the wrong that has been done, but
restorative justice takes a broader and deeper approach because there is much more involved
in crime and wrongdoing than law breaking.”).
153. See, e.g., STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 41, at 573 (noting that equity is
generally “preventative and protective, rather than restorative” and “seeks to prevent a medi-
tated wrong more often than to redress an injury already done”).
154. BUSH AND FOLGER, supra note 71, at 100–01.
155. Id. at 91.
156. See id. at 29, 89 (Transformative mediation aims at creating “a world in which people
are not just better off, but better: more human and humane” and where parties “voluntarily
choose to become more open, attentive, sympathetic, and responsive to the situation of the
other party . . .”).
157. Id. at 91, 93.
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III. IMAGINING MEDIATION OF CURRENTLY NON-JUSTICIABLE
DISPUTES: TWO DILEMMAS
Before discussing how court-annexed mediation or similar prac-
tices might work in traditionally non-justiciable disputes, it is worth
considering whether there is any value in adding to the plethora of
causes of action currently remediable in court. To answer that ques-
tion, one might contemplate two of the most significant obstacles to
requiring mediation in very difficult conflicts, such as ones this Arti-
cle began with—the Nazis’ proposed march into Skokie and the
Westboro Baptist Church’s insistence on picketing military funer-
als—cases in which the values and world views of those in conflict
may seem incommensurable.158
One potential obstacle is the difficulty of forcing a wrongdoer
into mediation. Given that mediation, particularly transformative
mediation, requires that any resolution be voluntary, mandatory
mediation may be doomed from the start if one or both of those
entering it is coerced to be there. We might also see a major obsta-
cle in causing someone like Frank Collin, the organizer of the Nazi
march, to have a change of heart.  These obstacles cause us to won-
der whether mediation, especially mandatory mediation, is certain
to fail.
In practice, mediation holds out the promise of transformation,
even if it is mandatory, and the hope that someone like Frank Col-
lin can change. Perhaps this is because any mediation offers a
valuable opportunity for self-determination that the common law
courts and other social institutions do not. Self-determination, in
which mutual consent plays an important role, has been a core
value of the mediation movement from the outset.159 Originally, of
course, mediation was imagined as an entirely consensual portal of
justice. Parties could not be forced into the mediation process, nor
could a settlement be obtained without their voluntary and in-
formed consent.160 Indeed, perhaps the core value of mediation is
the willingness of the parties to participate throughout the process.
In the mediation paradigm, parties can exit at any time if they are
unhappy with the progress of the mediation.161 Moreover, because
158. See supra notes 12–31 and accompanying text.
159. See Welsh, supra note 37, at 3–4 (describing self-determination as “ ‘the fundamental
principle of mediation,’” which includes active and direct participation in communication
and negotiation, control of substantive norms in the process, creating settlement options,
and controlling the decision whether to settle); see also Dorcas Quek, Mandatory Mediation: An
Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of Implementing a Court-Mandated Mediation Program, 11 CAR-
DOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 479, 484 (2010).
160. See Welsh, supra note 37, at 17–18.
161. Id.
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of its consensual nature, mediation has been utilized to adjudicate
claims that might not be justiciable absent the parties’ agreement,
such as neighborhood disputes.162
Nevertheless, many courts have eliminated the voluntariness of
entrance into court-annexed mediation by requiring at least some
attempt to mediate, although these courts have not eliminated the
requirement that any settlement be voluntary.163 In practice, court-
annexed mediation programs vary in the extent to which an unwill-
ing party must participate. In some programs, attorneys are only
required to consider mediation or discuss it with their clients,
though the court may overrule their report that mediation will not
be helpful in resolving the dispute.164 In others, clients are required
to attend a first mediation meeting,165 and in still others, there is
some notion that they must mediate in good faith or suffer poten-
tial economic consequences when they return to court.166 Although
the concept of mandatory mediation may at first blush appear to be
an oxymoron, success rates for these mediations seem to mimic the
162. See, for example, the disputes handled by the Resolutions Northwest Neighborhood
Mediation Program in Portland, Oregon, which handles problems such as noise, pets, and
property maintenance, as well as litigable disputes such as nuisances and boundary disputes.
Neighborhood Mediation Program, RESOLUTIONS NORTHWEST, http://www.resolutionsnorthwest.
org/neighborhood_mediation_program (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
163. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 404 (describing mandatory court-annexed
mediation); Quek, supra note 159, at 484 (describing the controversy over whether
mandatory mediation is a temporary expedient or no longer needed because of the growth
of ADR).
164. McAdoo et al., supra note 34, at 8; see, e.g., McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 407–08;
see also Quek, supra note 159, at 485–86 (noting Professor Sander’s view that mandatory medi-
ation “is not an oxymoron” because there is a distinction between being coerced to enter the
process and being coerced within the process, while other authors point out that mandatory
mediation only requires parties to try to settle, and they have access to litigation if they fail).
165. Quek, supra note 159, at 488–90. Quek describes systems which automatically refer
some or may refer some cases at the judge’s discretion with no sanctions if the parties object
(Central London County Court pilot); systems in which a court may require a court appear-
ance (Queensland) or orientation session (Virginia) before the parties decide whether to
mediate; and systems which refer all cases, but permit an exemption through court motion
(Ontario). Id. Quek also notes that some Australian states may refer parties to mandatory
mediation. Id.
166. Id. at 489 (describing the U.K. system in which the court may take account of unrea-
sonable conduct in refusing to mediate in determining costs assessed against the party and
may mandate mediation before a client is entitled to a Legal Aid lawyer). In perhaps an
interesting parallel to the requirement that mediation parties appear but not resolve their
differences, Justice Story notes that in some of the earliest requests for equity relief, the
plaintiff merely asked the chancellor to tell the defendant to appear or to be examined,
without any other relief being sought. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS, supra note 68, at 9–10,
15–16. Story argues that interrogatories were later included in the bill, or complaint, with the
goal to “sift more thoroughly the conscience of the defendant as to these facts.” Id. at 9–10.
He divided bills in equity into those praying for relief (based on a right, interpleaders, or
certiorari) and those not praying for relief (to perpetuate witness testimony and discovery.).
Id. at 15–16.
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success rates for voluntary court-annexed or private mediation.167
Some studies have reported that parties forced into mediation are
less satisfied with the process if their mediations fail, in part because
of the seemingly duplicate cost of pursuing mediation and then go-
ing to court, where they wanted to be in the first place.168 However,
for those who succeed, the fact that the proceeding was initially in-
voluntary is not viewed as an unacceptable violation of rights or a
breach of the litigants’ autonomy.169
What might account for this seemingly incongruous result? Per-
haps it is because, as mandatory court-annexed mediation becomes
part of the regular process for adjudicating conflicts, litigants and
their lawyers have come to accept the fact that mediation is part of
the process they must undergo to achieve a result, much like dis-
tasteful aspects of litigation, such as pleadings and discovery.
Fighting against or complaining about the inevitable may be seen as
a waste of time and energy that would be better spent trying to
achieve one’s objective in mediation. Second, mediation studies
show high success and satisfaction rates.170 As the public and the
bar become familiar with these studies, even those who initially dis-
missed mediation as a waste of time may come to have faith in
mediation as a more successful and less expensive route for dispute
resolution.171
Third, since remedy options are limited in common law courts,
those forced into mandatory mediation may believe that they have a
higher chance of getting what they really want because they have
more control over the process than if they must deal with the wild
cards of judicial interpretation.172 Perhaps because they are risk-
averse, litigants might prefer an outcome that they can say “no” to
rather than rolling the dice with an unknown judge or jury. Perhaps
they believe that in a direct encounter with the other party they will
have more influence in getting his assent; in court, their influence
over the other party may be dissipated by judicial interference.173 As
167. McAdoo et al., supra note 34, at 9 (noting that satisfaction rates do not vary by case
type).
168. Cf. Quek, supra note 159, at 482, 486.
169. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 422–23 (noting that parties perceive media-
tions as fair or are satisfied with them).
170. McAdoo et al., supra note 34, at 8 (noting the high success and satisfaction rates with
mandatory mediation).
171. For an example of this attempt to create public awareness about the success of medi-
ation, see AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 37, at 5.
172. See Welsh, supra note 37, at 8, 17 (noting that mediation was assumed to permit
parties to control substantive norms of their conflict, processes of participation, options for
settlement, and the final decision); infra note 178.
173. If true, advocates’ concerns that mediation exacerbates an imbalance of power may
be well-placed. See supra note 71; infra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
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suggested earlier, this concern has troubled advocates for victims of
domestic abuse174 and resulted in both political pushback and, in
some cases, statutory exceptions to mediation requirements for
such victims.175 However, this opportunity for better remedies is a
potential asset in gaining the cooperation of parties in court-or-
dered mediations.
Finally, mediation is advertised as a “kinder, gentler” approach to
dispute resolution.176 Parties report satisfaction with their ability to
participate more directly in the process.177 For the many individuals
who hate conflict, as well as those who are concerned about the
spillover effects of conflict on children, family, and friends, the
prospect of a less damaging way to achieve closure may be attrac-
tive. The value of peace and continued good relationships with the
other party may be worth giving up the possibility of a greater finan-
cial gain through the courts. None of the available evidence to this
point suggests that, if legislators or courts develop new causes of
action that can only be pursued through mediation, requiring a
claimed wrongdoer to present himself for mediation will automati-
cally result in failure of the mediation process.
The next legitimate concern is whether introducing new causes
of action that are only subjects of mediation will be a waste of time
because the defendants in these causes of action will never have the
incentive to settle when they know the plaintiffs cannot turn to the
courts to obtain justice. In fact, it may be that many of those who
agree to settlements in mandated mediations do so only because
they believe that they will fare worse in court or that the entire pro-
cess will be so expensive that they are better off finishing the
dispute in mediation.178
174. See, e.g., BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 71, at 22–23 (describing the “oppression story”
whereby mediation has magnified power imbalances).
175. See, e.g., Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse, 23 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 43, 55–56 (1995) (describing varieties of exemptions for spouses suffering from
domestic abuse).
176. See Richard Calkins, Mediation: The Gentler Way, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 277, 279–80
(1996).
177. See Quek, supra note 159, at 482 (noting party endorsement of mediation because of
their ability to tell their story and contribute to the outcome).
178. Alona M. Gottfried, Mediation vs Litigation: Choosing Your Own Outcome, ARIZONA ME-
DIATION (July 17, 2011), http://azmediator.com/mediation-vs-litigation-choosing-your-own-
outcome/ (“Judges and juries make mistakes or may simply not agree with your position. . . .
When you are leaving your fate in the hands of others, you are gambling with some of the
most important decisions in your life. In order to get to the point of letting someone else
decide, you will likely have to spend a lot of time and money and energy first. Litigation is not
free or quickly resolved . . . If you think the other party is unreasonable, having a public (not
confidential) battle is not the best choice. In mediation, the mediator helps both parties
become reasonable and reach an acceptable agreement in a confidential and comfortable
environment.”).
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However, there may be other incentives for cooperation for
those haled into a public mediation-only system of justice besides
the threat of a lawsuit. From a self-interested point of view, public
reputation is an important concern that causes some defendants to
settle lawsuits before they are filed.179 Indeed, plaintiffs’ attorneys
often give corporate defendants the opportunity to negotiate a set-
tlement before filing in order to avoid reputational harm.180 In
these situations, mandatory mediation prior to more public litiga-
tion may be a welcome relief to prospective defendants, particularly
for those who deem themselves innocent.
Still, other defendants may be unaware that their actions have
injured others, or they may not understand the magnitude of the
injuries they caused. Once they are apprised of these facts through
mediation, they might be willing to sit down and talk with their vic-
tims about what happened or to offer redress. That response is less
likely to occur if they have been served with a traditional lawsuit
and been advised that their willingness to talk or cooperate might
be used against them.181 Similarly, some mediation defendants may
feel obliged to fight litigation on principle or because of the
broader ramifications in subsequent cases. There are many cases of
this type, such as newspapers that fight libel lawsuits in order to
preserve their First Amendment rights in future cases and organiza-
tions that refuse to settle environmental lawsuits or employment
claims because of the possibility that other plaintiffs will follow. De-
spite their principled stand, these defendants may nonetheless be
willing to sit down with those they have harmed, give them a chance
to tell their stories, and talk about what the defendants might vol-
untarily do to ameliorate the harms they have caused.
Finally, some defendants will want to tell their side of the story
and come to some kind of conciliation or reconciliation with in-
jured parties, even if they are not willing to acknowledge
wrongdoing or make monetary recompense. It is therefore good to
keep in mind that the chief purpose of mediation is not necessarily
to reach either a monetary or other kind of settlement that will
179. William S. Kleinman, Note, Who is Suing You? John Doe Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts,
61 TEX. L. REV. 547, 555 (1982) (noting potential damage to defendants’ reputation in cases
like sex or race discrimination, antitrust violations, or civil fraud as reasons for settling even
frivolous lawsuits).
180. Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to Remedy Civil Rights Violations when the Defendant is
Not an Intentional Perpetrator: The Problems of Unconscious Disparate Treatment and Unjustified Dis-
parate Impacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 225, 267 (2003) (describing companies’ use of
mediation in employment disputes to avoid reputational harm).
181. See, e.g., Donna L. Pavlick, Admission and Apology: The Horse and Carriage of the 21st
Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 829, 859–60 (2003) (describing how defendants avoid
apologies except in mediation because of the possible admission of liability in litigation).
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mimic what a plaintiff might have achieved in court. As transforma-
tive advocates have argued, something more is at stake in resolution
of many conflicts than simply moving money from the harming
party to the harmed party.182 Instead, mediation may offer the
chance for recognition and even reconciliation, particularly in dis-
putes where the most critical harm is to the relationship between
people.183 In fact, settlement in the sense of economic closure is
almost beside the point in transformative mediation,184 and its advo-
cates will argue that mediation can be successful even if it does not
come to closure on the specific legal cause that brought the parties
into mediation.185
To see the value in creating a parallel mediation system,
lawmakers will have to embrace the assumptions of transformative
mediation regarding the nature of human conflict and the willing-
ness of most individuals to try to resolve it. Transformative
mediation assumes that most individuals in conflict are willing to
act in good faith to achieve a just outcome for all parties as long as
they can be helped to take a step back from their own sense of
threat that occurs in conflict, to understand their own and others’
situations, and to tap that reservoir of good faith.186 The events and
circumstances that led up to the conflict instead cause them to re-
spond as fearful individuals do—by reducing their vision of the
circumstances to include and interpret the facts to match a self-
interested understanding of the situation and to justify their de-
mands (or refusal to meet others’ demands).187
In a somewhat similar vein, the restorative justice movement de-
scribes conflict that results in victimization as follows: sometimes
wrongdoers do not have the moral or emotional imagination to un-
derstand the nature and depth of injury they have caused their
victims and cannot tap into their deepest selves to acknowledge that
182. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 71, at 68–70 (describing limitations of problem-solv-
ing mediation).
183. See id. at 96–97 (describing opportunity for recognition and distinguishing it from
reconciliation, which may or may not occur); see also Vogel, supra note 9, at 565 (“[D]eep
within every human heart there is a restorative impulse to seek social healing that is taking
form in the world through the practices of restorative justice.”).
184. See, e.g., Pavlick, supra note 181, at 859–60 (discussing how settlement-driven
mediators may subvert values of transformative mediation).
185. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 71, at 94–95 (describing successes of transformative
mediation while attempting to define what “success” means when discussing transformative
mediation).
186. See id. at 89 (describing the transition from threat to responsiveness).
187. See id. (describing the initial reaction of an individual to conflict and the necessary
development of his or her perspective as a goal of mediation).
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wrongdoing.188 Restorative justice utilizes processes like victim-of-
fender mediation and restorative circles to help the wrongdoer
understand precisely how he has harmed the direct victim and
members of the community who have suffered indirect conse-
quences of his actions.189
In other words, restorative justice processes require the offender
to acknowledge that he bears responsibility for the wrong that was
done.190 Thus, at least some restorative justice advocates embrace a
slightly darker vision about human nature than advocates of trans-
formative mediation; restorative justice can admit the possibility
that human beings are not necessarily well intentioned and still
hold out examples of wrongdoers who have had a change of
heart.191 Restorative justice encourages offenders to acknowledge
not only the harm they have caused but also that they have commit-
ted a wrongful act. This is a difficult transition for most human
beings who are wont to justify the harm they have caused as de-
served, accidental, or otherwise not their fault.192
Restorative justice processes also aim to move the offender to a
genuine desire to repair that harm,193 much like transformative jus-
tice moves litigants to embrace the concerns of their adversaries as
something that they are also responsible for alleviating, if possi-
ble.194 Finally, victims, offenders, and any members of the
community involved in restorative processes work together to find
solutions that will both remediate the victim’s harm and restore the
offender to full ethical membership in his community, which may
require the community to help remediate the offender’s situation
as well.195
188. See LITTLE BOOK, supra note 3, at 16; HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 40–41 (1990)
(hereinafter CHANGING LENSES) (noting how prison encourages offenders to construct ratio-
nales for their offenses, try to divert blame from themselves, and insulate themselves from
victims).
189. See PRANIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 34–45 (describing the core values of restorative
justice).
190. See Vogel, supra note 9, at 573 (detailing the six “guiding questions of restorative
justice”); PRANIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 165–67.
191. See, e.g., CHANGING LENSES, supra note 188, at 180–84, 207–10 (describing realistic
acceptance of offender violence and place for punishment but demonstrating power of re-
storative justice with serious offenders).
192. Id. at 197.
193. Id. at 207 (discussing how some sex offenders come to write letters of apology to
their victims).
194. See Vogel, supra note 9, at 566 (“Restorative justice acknowledges the damaged rela-
tionships, as well as the injuries sustained by the victims, that result from any wrongdoing and
focuses on healing for all those involved, including communities and offenders.”).
195. See, e.g., PRANIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 10–14; Vogel, supra note 9, at 566
(“[T]ransformative possibilities for moving from the burden of past wrongdoing into the
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The Skokie and the Snyder cases present difficult tests of
whether transformative mediation or similar restorative practices
might actually work because a change of heart seems so impossible
given the vastly different world-views of the opposing sides. Al-
though there is not enough information on Frank Collin, head of
the Illinois Nazi Party, to fully predict his behavior, there are narra-
tive touch points in his life that might have been utilized by a
skillful mediator to help him understand and acknowledge the
plight of the Holocaust victims who were emotionally traumatized
by the proposed march into Skokie. Collin’s father was a Holocaust
survivor, a fact ironically acknowledged by historians of this case,196
but one that does not seem to have been the subject of any trans-
formative conversation between him and members of the Skokie
community. Moreover, Collin’s family members were disgusted by
his behavior.197 Their involvement in a restorative process and their
acknowledgement of issues that may have caused him to seek affir-
mation from the Nazi party do not seem to have been explored
through the litigation, nor is it likely that such concerns would have
been explored in a traditional process. No one appears to have
challenged him on the seemingly impulsive nature of his decision
to march in Skokie after his requests to march in Chicago—which
targeted African Americans whom his party claimed were causing
destruction in the city—were stymied by Chicago officials.198 Here
again, had Skokie or Chicago city officials involved him or his fol-
lowers in a mediation or restorative process, it might have been
possible to grant Collin the publicity he sought without publicly
traumatizing Skokie residents with the thought of a march through
their hometown.199
On the other side, mandatory mediation might have empowered
the Skokie residents who heard that the Nazis were going to march
promise of a new future in which new relationships are forged so that all life might
flourish.”).
196. STRUM, supra note 12, at 4. Collin’s given name was Frank Cohn, and his father Max
had been in Dachau for three months. When Max Cohn reached the United States, he
changed his name to Collin and married an American Catholic. Id. Frank Collin was later
thrown out of his previous affiliation, the National Socialist White People’s Party, when they
discovered he had Jewish ancestry. Id. at 5.
197. Id. at 4–5 (noting that Frank’s family thought his Nazism was “incomprehensible and
offensive” and that his family “completely disapproved of his Nazi activities”).
198. Id. at 16–18 (describing the politics around the bond requirements in Chicago and
suburbs where Collin asked to march).
199. Of course, perhaps none of this would have worked. While Collin eventually repudi-
ated his neo-Nazi beliefs in favor of a pre-Colombian mythology, it is more likely that his
convictions for sexual activity with children severed his relationship with the party, which may
indicate something about his possibility for a change of heart. Id. at 14.
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in their town.200 Instead, some tried to avoid confronting their
past,201 while others were “in almost a catatonic state—petrified—
shaking—crying . . . trembling at the thought of ‘those swastikas
and brown shirts and boots and Nazi insignia.’”202 Still others were
enraged to the point of possible violence against the Nazis.203
Mandatory mediation might have allowed these victims to join
other victims who saw this conflict as an opportunity to tell the story
of this tragedy to the larger community and to help government
officials understand why this march might be so painful for those
whom the Nazis rounded up, imprisoned, and tortured.204
Similarly, although it may be difficult to imagine that members
of the Westboro Baptist Church would cease and desist in their ac-
tivities, it is hard to know how they might have responded if they
were forced to encounter the living Albert Snyder, hear the real
story of his son’s life and death, and hear his pain. Like Frank Col-
lin,205 WBC has painted itself as a victim, as the target of
government attempts to suppress its speech because of its claimed
“prophetic” character.206 A forced encounter with a real person
damaged by their activities might turn the hearts of some members
of that church away from their own paranoia and denial to consider
the harm they are causing others.
Litigation does not generally serve the same purpose. Due to the
public, isolated, and occasionally dangerous position that a named
victim in such cases occupies, in addition to the strong likelihood
that the law will fail victims, the common law system requires ex-
traordinary courage from individuals who serve as named plaintiffs
in these cases. In the Skokie case, the litigation process failed to
200. See id. at 59–60 (describing the response of survivors at a meeting announcing that
the Nazis were not coming).
201. Id. at 8, 20.
202. Id. at 59–60 (describing a community meeting after the trial court issued an injunc-
tion against the Skokie march).
203. Id. at 52–53 (detailing testimony from Frank Richter of the Synagogue Council of
Skokie).
204. Id. at 20–21 (noting that some survivors felt guilt that they had not resisted enough
during the Holocaust and had an obligation to atone by taking action against the proposed
assault on their community).
205. Id. at 14 (discussing Collin’s view that Jews had inordinate financial and legal power
in the United States and his calls for whites to gain that power back).
206. See, e.g., America Persecutes the Saints of God, GOD HATES AMERICA (Mar 26, 2008),
http://www.godhatestheworld.com/america/index.html (“15 years ago, in a conspiracy be-
tween members of the police, media, city government, and a crooked lawyer/judge/strip
joint owner/bloody jew, america sought to silence WBC by beating her members bloody on
the sidewalks outside the Vintage Restaurant in Topeka. Every day since (not most every day,
not every day except bad weather, not most days, but EVERY DAY), WBC has stood on those
same sidewalks to remind you of your crimes and hatred, and that God will avenge our blood,
which cries to him from that ground (Gen 4:10).”).
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offer most Holocaust victims the opportunity or encouragement to
speak in a safe space about their trauma and their fears of a recur-
rence.207 In Snyder, the Supreme Court’s constitutional protection
for speech left Albert Snyder without remedy for a terrible harm. By
not offering a safer, less public opportunity to confront those who
were about to harm them, both Snyder and the Holocaust victims
were deprived of the opportunity to describe their experiences
through telling their stories both to those who wanted to harm
them and to the community. This experience may have allowed
them to gain a sense of empowerment.
Through transformative mediation or restorative processes, even
if the Skokie Nazis had been recalcitrant, the affected residents
could have named their experiences and fears and identified what
they needed in order to reassure themselves that the wrongs they
suffered would not occur again. They also may have been able to
seek support from a wider community in shielding themselves from
some of the harm that they individually experienced. In other cities
where anti-Semitic acts have occurred, non-Jewish citizens have
stepped up to show solidarity with Jews and to let them know that
they would not be singled out and taken away, like many Jews were
taken in Nazi Germany. For example, some have burned Chanukah
candles in their homes and worn yellow stars in public.208 Others
have gathered in public places to show their support after attacks
on synagogues.209 Indeed, a more robust community restorative
process might have led the African Americans of Chicago and the
207. Although the trial judge, Judge Wosik, who had seen first-hand the horrors of the
Nazis, ignored the First Amendment arguments in support of the Nazis, he hardly gave the
City of Skokie the opportunity to present its entire case. STRUM, supra note 12, at 54–56. The
Illinois Appellate Court attempted to give “half a loaf” by permitting the march but forbid-
ding the display of the swastika. Id. at 76–78; see also Vogel, supra note 9, at 565 (noting that
restorative justice offers the promise of a “ ‘safe place’ [where] we are able to take action
through dialogue to build community so that all life might flourish”).
208. See Patrick Sauer, A Holiday Story of Community Solidarity Revisited: Mont. Townsfolk
Unite Against Anti-Semitism, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2010, 1:04 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/patrick-sauer/the-townsfolk-of-billings_b_793871.html (describing Billings’
citizens show of paper menorahs in their windows after anti-Semitic violence); Rone Tem-
pest, 80,000 March in Paris to Protest Anti-Semitic Acts, L.A. TIMES (May 15, 1990), http://
articles.latimes.com/1990-05-15/news/mn-160_1_le-pen (describing French marchers wear-
ing yellow stars to protest synagogue burning).
209. See, e.g., John Ensslin, Bergen County Community Leaders Rally for Solidarity After Anti-
Semitic Incidents, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Feb. 1, 2012, 10:40 PM), http://www.northjersey.com/
news/bergen/Jewish_and_African_American_community_leaders_rally_for_solidarity_after_
anti_Semitic_incidents.html (describing prayer vigil organized by the NAACP after a Molotov
cocktail was thrown at a Jewish synagogue in Bergen County, New York); Jake New, Chabad
House Menorah Lighting Symbolizes Perseverance, Support, IND. DAILY STUDENT (Dec. 6, 2010,
12:55 AM), http://www.idsnews.com/news/story.aspx?id=78889 (describing a menorah
lighting ceremony at Indiana University held to support the local Jewish community after
recent destruction of Hebrew texts and other anti-Semetic acts).
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Jewish Americans of Skokie to form stronger bonds, recognizing
that they were both targeted by Collin.
In Snyder’s case, requiring the WBC to enter mediation might
have resulted in other church and military support groups coming
together to support the Snyders. It may have further galvanized the
kinds of cordons around military funerals that sprang up in the
wake of the WBC’s activity to protect grieving family members from
observing hateful slurs.210 Thus, in the worst case, even if the de-
fendants were unmoved, the victims would still have had the
opportunity to become empowered and seek creative solutions with
others to ameliorate the harms they suffered.
Almost none of these possible outcomes are offered as a standard
opportunity in traditional litigation, though occasionally they occur
because of the wisdom of the attorneys, the judge, or the parties
themselves. In litigation, parties are discouraged from telling their
whole stories in context because judges require litigants to identify
particular concrete facts upon which relief can be granted and limit
testimony to the relevant cause of action.
In Skokie, those Jews who did step up as litigants struggled to
describe a justiciable harm for the courts to focus on, such as physi-
cal injury or economic loss,211 even though their symbolic and
psychological harm was clear to most observers and much worse for
many than any tangible injury.212 Indeed, especially in a constitu-
tional case, some “state interests,” which are really attempts to
protect private parties, may appear less consequential because they
are stated as abstractions in court cases, rather than evidenced by
the testimony of real people whom the government is attempting to
protect. Moreover, for the most part, traditional litigation does not
require litigants to acknowledge that they have caused harm to
others. In fact, it arguably discourages acknowledgement and tak-
ing responsibility for one’s actions because an admission may be
followed by remedial court judgments against the defendant.213
Lawyers of wrongdoers are, for the most part, neither schooled in
nor comfortable with counseling clients to acknowledge responsi-
bility and make amends. Their primary impetus is to defend their
client’s positions at all costs.
210. See, e.g., Texas A&M Students Form Human Wall To Block Westboro Baptist Church Protes-
tors From Soldier Roy Tisdale’s Funeral, HUFFINGTON POST, May 30, 2013, available at http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/06/texas-am-students_n_1653002.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2013).
211. See STRUM, supra note 12, at 97–99 (describing testimony on emotional harm and
court reactions to it).
212. See id. at 52–53, 59–60.
213. See Pavlick, supra note 181, at 854.
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Traditional litigation also does not help either party to develop a
clear understanding of his interests, goals, or vision for a future
with the opponent absent the intervention of extraordinary lawyers
or judges. Trial lawyers traditionally have been trained to narrow
their focus to those issues and concerns that are litigable and refer
or defer broader concerns of the client to others. For all of these
reasons, transformative mediation or other restorative practices
may be able to offer both victims and those who have harmed them
more real justice than the courts can give, even acknowledging that
a mediation may flounder if a recalcitrant wrongdoer walks away.
Moreover, there is evidence that ADR practices can transform
even the most hardened wrongdoers214 and aggrieved victims. Per-
haps one of the most astonishing restorative justice narratives
documents the journey of the Streufert family, who had to deal with
the brutal rape and murder of their eighteen-year-old daughter,
Carin, just after she came home from her first year in college.215
After imprisoning her murderers did not bring closure to the fam-
ily, they worked with mediator Mark Umbreit to confront the
offenders about their daughter and their loss and to learn more
about what happened in her final moments. 216
In coming to acknowledge these offenders as human beings wor-
thy of dialogue and accountable for their wrongdoing, the Streufert
family was able to partially work through its grief,217 a result not
usually available in the traditional justice system. Restorative justice
advocates recount many other less dramatic but equally surprising
results: property victims of youthful offenders who become their
mentors and parental figures, employees who were able to find a
workable relationship with their supervisor after fifteen years of ten-
sion, and so forth.218
214. See, e.g., Malcolm Thorburn, The Impossible Dreams and Modest Reality of Restorative Jus-
tice, 30 Queens L.J. 863, 877 (2005) (recounting, albeit with skepticism, restorative justice
stories of “hardened criminals who volunteer to take care of their victims” and “drug-ad-
dicted robbers who change their ways”).
215. See, e.g., Glimmer of Hope, NAT’L FILM BD. OF CAN., http://onf-nfb.gc.ca/en/our-col-
lection/?idfilm=33348#nav-resume.
216. See Lynette Parker, Video Review: Glimmer of Hope, RESTORATIVEJUSTICE ONLINE (Jul.
2006), http://www.restorativejustice.org/editions/2006/july06/videoreview.
217. See Glimmer of Hope, supra note 215.
218. See, e.g., Doug Borch, Stories of Courage and Compassion, THE CENTRE FOR RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE, http://www.sfu.ca/crj/news/stories/doug-borch.html (discussing the story of how
one homeowner who was a victim of a youth’s break-in learned of the youth’s poverty and
bought the child’s family food for Christmas dinner).
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IV. DESIGNING A SYSTEM: PROCESSES AND FRAMING
CAUSES OF ACTION
Although the specific parameters of a mediation-only legal sys-
tem for currently non-justiciable causes of action will need to be
worked out, there are some initial criteria for defining such causes
of action and at least one formula for handling such causes of ac-
tion in the context of the current common law court system.
Consistent with the purpose for creating a separate mediation-only
track for currently non-justiciable causes of action, lawmakers,
whether legislatures or courts, could triage possible conflicts into
three categories.
First, some conflicts should simply result in more traditional
causes of action. These are emerging conflicts and harms that
should be redressable through traditional judicial decision-making.
For instance, new torts of invasion of privacy or cyber-harms might
fit into this category. For these harms, damages, injunctions, and
other traditional remedies should be available to plaintiffs regard-
less of whether they proceed to court-annexed mediation and
achieve an outcome.
Second, some conflicts are not appropriately dealt with by a pub-
lic judicial system at all, not even by mandatory mediation, for a
variety of public policy reasons ranging from manageability to pub-
lic value concerns about privacy. As examples, even if mediation
might be a helpful tool in resolving these kinds of conflicts, nobody
would have a legislative body order mediation in most cases of par-
ent-child conflicts over the parent’s child-rearing decisions, “trash-
talking” between friends in a high school, or emotional antagonism
between neighbors because one is using his property for purposes
disliked by the neighbor, such as plantings or buildings.
Third, some causes of action should be mediation-only claims,
with a clear definition of the elements of those causes of action
either by statute or common law court definition. To use a contem-
porary example that is flummoxing lawmakers, schools have seen a
rise in cyberstalking, cyberbullying, and threatening or demeaning
commentary by students against other students, which have re-
sulted in violence or hostile environments on school grounds.219
The line between criminal or civilly punishable, unprotected behav-
ior and protected First Amendment speech is still being drawn.220
219. See Bethan Noonan, Note, Crafting Legislation to Prevent Cyberbullying: The Use of Educa-
tion, Reporting, and Threshold Requirements, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 330, 334–35
(2011) (describing the prevalence of student cyberbullying).
220. See id. at 339–43 (describing Supreme Court responses to First Amendment
defenses).
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However, a court or legislative body might determine that some
hostile commentary is appropriate for mandatory mediation, even
if it would be protected from criminal punishment or civil damages
under the First Amendment.
What common elements would most mediation-only causes of ac-
tion have? To make a list, one might look at constitutional cases
where harm has occurred but there was no remedy available. Some
of these cases, such as Snyder, involve so-called “hate speech.” These
are cases in which speakers exercising their First Amendment rights
use derogatory language that cause severe emotional harm or fear
in others, but their speech is nevertheless protected, unlike true
threats, inciting words, fighting words, or libel.221 A second group
of such cases sound in invasion of privacy. One example is the pub-
lication of painfully embarrassing facts, such as the identity of a
rape victim, which is protected by the First Amendment if the infor-
mation is lawfully obtained.222 These cases involve many of the
standard elements of tort law, including morally wrong behavior; a
single culpable party; and some identifiable harm to an individual
person, which is widely regarded by society as beyond the pale. Yet,
under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, these cases are non-
justiciable, either civilly or criminally.223
Why might it be preferable to use elements similar to traditional
torts to define those conflicts that would now become justiciable
only through mediation but not through the courts? First, unless
the alleged behavior is widely considered morally problematic in
society’s eyes, it is difficult to justify responding with public re-
sources. As hate speech and invasion of privacy cases have
illustrated, it may sometimes be difficult to draw the line between
morally offensive behavior and publicly acceptable, or even publi-
cally laudable, behavior. For example, both society and its legal
institutions, all the way up to the Supreme Court, have struggled
over whether expression of disapproval of a minority group or its
behavior—such as “Islam threatens Western values”—is hate
speech.224 Similarly, there have been debates about whether disclo-
sure of the name of a rape victim is not only defensible, but also
221. See RONALD L.K. COLLINS & SAM CHALTAIN, WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID TO BE FREE:
STORIES OF FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 172–73 (2011) (discussing public responses to hate
speech).
222. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
223. See id.
224. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Hate Speech or Free Speech? What Much of West Bans is Protected in
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/world/americas/
11iht-hate.4.13645369.html (discussing Canadian struggles with the definition of hate
speech); see also Mike LaBossiere, Funerals, Freedom, and God Hates Fags, TALKING PHILOSOPHY
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good because publication of rapes lessens the shame for other rape
victims and promotes truth about the realities of rape in our soci-
ety.225 Except as limited by constitutional or similar constraints,
public policy, as expressed by legislatures in statutes and by those
courts empowered to extend the common law, should establish
what is morally wrongful enough to require a defendant to enter
mediation.
Second, the mediation-only parallel system might better handle
cases that do not involve wrongful states of mind that are tradition-
ally required in common law criminal and tort cases. 226 To be sure,
strict liability torts and crimes seem to be growing in number.227
Yet, there may be good reasons to grant a mediation-only cause of
action for still other cases where there is no traditional intent. Al-
though both systems have elimination of future harm as a goal,
strict liability accomplishes that goal through the use of a threat
(i.e. deterrence)228 rather than seeking the wrongdoer’s voluntary
and good faith desistance from the behavior, as transformative me-
diation does. Other torts are premised on the need for cost-shifting
from an injured plaintiff to a defendant.229 By contrast, transforma-
tive mediation is not primarily about distributive justice, but instead
about personal empowerment and interaction.230
Thus, not every element of a traditional tort would need to be
present in a mediation-only cause of action. As another example,
(Oct. 8, 2010), http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=2237 (arguing the ethics versus legal
rights of what free speech entails).
225. See, e.g., Michelle Johnson, Of Public Interest: How Courts Handle Rape Victims’ Privacy
Suits, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 201, 201 (1999).
226. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539
(1972) (describing how strict liability, which is liability without fault, is suspect in both tort
and criminal law).
227. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 786 (1993)
(“[R]ecent commentary . . . suggests that this regime of strict liability crime has begun to
expand beyond its conventional domain . . . .”); David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV.
703, 705 (1992) (discussing the growth of both strict liability and negligence torts).
228. See generally K. James Sangston, Note, I’ll Tell You What Happened If You Promise Not to
Sue Me—Will No-Fault Liability Improve Patient Safety Through Increased Reporting of Medical Er-
rors?, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1227, 1237 (2003) (noting medical tort system goals as
“compensation to the injured patient, deterrence of the provider’s harmful behavior, and
fairness to both parties”).
229. See generally id.
230. See Robert Baruch Bush & Sally Pope, Changing the Quality of Conflict Interaction: The
Principles and Practice of Transformative Mediation, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 67, 85–86 (2002)
(discussing empowerment and recognition shifts through communication, which are the
goals of transformative mediation).
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both tort and criminal causes of action require some causal connec-
tion between the wrongful behavior and the harmful outcome.231
This element is not necessary in a mediation-only cause of action.
In mediation, because the objective is restoration of a relationship,
prevention of future harm, or some agreed-upon amelioration of
past harm, a strict rule of proof of causation is not as necessary, or
may at least be relaxed. Although mediation might be helpful to
resolve conflicts that do not involve these elements, the goals of
mediation do not require a causation element because the goal of
the mediation is not to assign responsibility, but to change behavior
and relationships.
Another modifiable element, one that has bedeviled lawmakers
attempting to distinguish wrongs appropriate for adjudication from
those that are not, is the problem of harm. The common law cus-
tomarily recognizes only certain kinds of injury as compensable,
many of which can be established in the material world—a physical
injury, death, or the loss of property that can be proven. To be sure,
the law once recognized more kinds of especially damaging emo-
tional harm that usually had reputational consequences, such as
vulgar telephone harassment of women,232 slander, or, in an older
era, alienation of affections.233 Yet, in recent times, both courts and
legislatures have been slower to extend legal protection to less tan-
gible and less objectively provable injuries. For example, courts and
legislatures have required that non-tangible harm be substantiated
by tangible evidence—e.g., those who suffer emotional stress often
had to show that they had to seek medical help for it234—or have
required that emotional harm be coupled with egregious behavior
or significantly wrongful intent in order to warrant traditional legal
231. See, e.g., Michael Steenson, Engler v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. and Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1335, 1364 (2006) (noting require-
ment of establishing causation in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases); see also
Susan W. Brenner & Megan Rehberg, “Kiddie Crime”? The Utility of Criminal Law in Controlling
Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 39 (2009) (noting difficulty of establishing causation
between perpetrator and victim in cyberbullying cases because of sometimes indirect chain of
causation).
232. See, e.g., Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 231, at 16 (discussing century-old crimes
punishing vulgar and obscene telephone calls).
233. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA 1 LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:65 (2d ed. 2011 updated) (distin-
guishing emotional harm of intentional infliction tort from reputational harm redressed by
libel); Shauna M. Deans, Comment, The Forgotten Side of the Battlefield in America’s War on
Infidelity: A Call for Revamping, Reviving and Reworking of Criminal Conversation and Alienation of
Affections, 53 HOW. L.J. 377, 388 (2010) (discussing intangible harm redressed by alienation
of affections and criminal conversation torts).
234. See, e.g., Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 231, at 19–20 (discussing Michigan stalking
statute requiring “significant mental suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily,
require medical or other professional treatment or counseling”).
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redress. Thus, for example, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims that involve malicious intent and egregious behavior
have long been recognized, sometimes without proof of health con-
sequences.235 However, negligent infliction of emotional distress, a
relatively new tort in some jurisdictions that involves both a less
wrongful state of mind and usually less wrongful behavior, has been
particularly hard to establish without a tangible manifestation of
medical or other harm to the victim.236
Once again, because mediation does not seek to assign blame
and force one party to give up his property to his victim, the need
objectively to identify the precise nature of harm and prove it con-
vincingly is not as great. That is not to say that the law should
recognize purely subjective slights that an unusually sensitive per-
son might consider damaging—for instance, a teasing remark
about someone’s height or weight. However, there will be certain
kinds of emotional or other non-tangible harm that society is pre-
pared to acknowledge as severe enough to warrant some legal
intervention, if not traditional adjudication. In addition to public
disclosure of facts involving rape or incest involving a young person
or child, for example, some other situations might give rise to legiti-
mate social concern. Examples might well include the picketing of
Lance Corporal Snyder’s funeral or even cyberbullying that does
not rise to the level of legal stalking or libel.237 Or, to use a recent
example, there might be a mediation-only cause of action for the
Internet publication of photos of intimate behavior by a person
who was not aware he was being filmed.238 All of these situations
might be ripe for, and indeed handled better by, court-annexed
235. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1061, 1079 (2006) (noting that nominal damages and recovery for emotional harm are
generally available even without physical harm). But see Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 231,
at 22 (noting that the “emotional distress” stalking and harassment statutes require more
than “self-diagnosed psychic injury” but incorporate a “reasonable person” standard to en-
sure that such conduct inflicts “an objectively ascertainable harm”).
236. See Simons, supra note 235, at 1079 (“‘Intentional wrongdoers,’ as we tend to call
them, are the worst type of tortfeasor, worse than merely reckless or negligent actors. (In-
deed, on this view, intentional torts could be considered a highly aggravated subcategory of
negligence: negligence is modestly unreasonable behavior, while an intentional tort is highly
unreasonable behavior.).”); John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional
Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 810 (2007) (noting an early recovery barrier to negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress was the requirement that “the plaintiff sustain some
contemporaneous physical injury or physical impact to their person as a result of the negli-
gent act,” which is still followed in some states). Kircher also notes that the Restatement
Second of Torts requires physical harm as well. Id. at 831.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 21–31 (describing Mr. Snyder’s experience);
supra text accompanying notes 219–20 (highlighting issues with cyberbullying).
238. A parallel example might be found in the 2012 suicide of a Rutgers student whose
roommates spied on his sexual tryst with a man using their webcam. Christina Boyle, Tyler’s
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mediation than by a traditional public trial where even more dam-
age may be done to the victims.
Ultimately, through the techniques of mediation, such as narra-
tive, interest identification, and option generation, the use of
transforming processes may generate outcomes that are more im-
portant to the parties than any outcome they might have achieved
through litigation, even if litigation had been available to the plain-
tiff. In addition to the possibility of some repair of an ongoing
relationship, which lessens the chance of conflict over future issues,
a defendant in such a process may be educated about the ways in
which his or her practices cause harm and may be motivated to find
alternative ways to conduct business that do not result in those
harms.
For instance, in some restorative processes, such as those involv-
ing Muslims whose employers have violated their religious
accommodation rights, victims and their advocates have been
moved to publicly praise former wrongdoers for mending their
ways.239 In this way, victims are empowered because they are the
narrators who frame the story, and wrongdoers receive public en-
couragement to continue to do the right thing in the future. As
suggested, even if the mediation is unsuccessful because a defen-
dant is recalcitrant, a victim may find new power to name her
victimization. In so doing, she may achieve some sense of personal
power over the situation and come closer to winning her struggle to
prevent future victimization.
Moreover, a plaintiff may be emotionally empowered to get past
the wrong he has suffered when he is able to hear the defendant’s
story and to learn that the defendant’s reasons for his behavior
were not motivated by the ill will or disempowering intent that the
victim assumes.240 Often in criminal justice restorative processes,
the fear victims feel that a victimizer is larger than life and a contin-
uing threat is ameliorated when victims can come to understand
that their victimizers are also vulnerable and broken.241
Angst: Troubled pre-suicide, But Spying Drove him to it, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 28, 2012, at 22,
2012 WLNR 14227655 (last visited October 19, 2013).
239. See CAIR MINNESOTA, http://mn.cair.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
240. For example, a victim of home vandalism may discover that the perpetrator is taking
out his anger because of abuse he is suffering in his own home.
241. See, e.g., CHANGING LENSES, supra note 188, at 20–26, 191–93 (describing victim dis-
empowerment and use of restorative justice to restore a sense of safety and right the balance
between victim and offender).
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V. TESTING A MEDIATION-ONLY CAUSE OF ACTION:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
This Article argues, as a matter of public policy, that courts and
legislatures should create mediation-only causes of action for con-
flicts that currently are not adjudicated through the common law
court system. However, there are important reasons that some con-
flicts are not justiciable. In addition to the problem of establishing
common elements of wrongful behavior—intent, causation, and
harm—that have traditionally been required to justify coercing a
defendant or depriving him of his property, overriding public pol-
icy values can counsel against punishing even an admitted
wrongdoer. Many times, these values are constitutional constraints.
Using the hate speech case of Snyder v. Phelps and invasion of
privacy/rape disclosure cases, it is important to test whether these
larger social concerns should counsel against requiring a defendant
to enter mediation because of his behavior, even if a court would be
barred from awarding damages or imposing criminal liability for
that behavior.
Cynthia Cohn, a seventeen-year-old girl, was raped and choked to
death in August 1971.242 During the indictment of six boys for the
rape, a newsman for WBS-TV, owned by Cox Broadcasting, was
shown a copy of the indictment naming Cynthia as the victim.243 He
later identified Cynthia by name and showed her high school year-
book photo in a news broadcast, which the station repeated the
next day.244 Michelle Johnson repeats the damage documented in
news reports on the family: “[f]or Cynthia’s family, the public dis-
closure of her name turned life into a nightmare. Her brother and
sisters were subjected to humiliating taunts. Cruel children posted
graffiti that read: FREE THE SANDY SPRINGS SIX.”245 Described
as “hurt, mortified, and angry,” Cohn’s father sued the TV station
for invasion of privacy under a Georgia statute that makes the publi-
cation of a rape victim’s name a misdemeanor.246
In a similar case, B.J.F. sued The Florida Star under a Florida law
prohibiting the publication of a rape victim’s name.247 The Jackson-
ville-based newspaper inadvertently published B.J.F’s name after
242. Johnson, supra note 225, at 221.
243. Id.
244. Id
245. Id. (quoting The Right to Privacy, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 17, 1975, at 66).
246. Id. at 221–22 (describing Martin Cohn’s suit against the broadcasting company).
247. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536–38 (1989) (overturning the Florida
law).
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obtaining it from a copy of the crime report posted in the press-
room.248 As a result of this story, which B.J.F. learned about from
friends, “[h]er mother received several threatening phone calls,
and eventually the victim felt compelled to move, change her
phone number, seek police protection and get counseling for
mental health.”249 She was originally awarded $100,000 in damages
for negligent violation of the non-disclosure law.250
In both of these private disclosure cases and the Snyder case, the
Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protected the
wrongdoers. In the Snyder case, the trial jury found Phelps guilty of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of pri-
vacy.251 However, the Supreme Court used a somewhat garbled
version of the public forum doctrine to argue that WBC was legally
entitled to express its opinion on public property despite the emo-
tional harm to LCpl. Snyder’s father.252 In Cohn, after the Georgia
high court ruled that Mr. Cohn could bring an invasion of privacy
suit against the broadcasters, 253 the Supreme Court held that the
publication of legally obtained, non-libelous information was pro-
tected under the First Amendment254 and that the statute
protecting the names of rape victims was therefore unconstitu-
tional.255 In Florida Star, the Supreme Court similarly held that news
organizations cannot be sued for printing legally obtained informa-
tion unless the state has an interest of the highest order that takes
into consideration the specific facts of the case.256
In these cases, the Supreme Court considered the larger public
policy issues that would arise if putative First Amendment rights
were suppressed. In determining that such speech is protected
under the Speech or Press Clauses of the First Amendment, the
248. Id. at 524 (also noting that publication of B.J.F.’s name violated The Florida Star’s own
internal policy); Johnson, supra note 225, at 226; see also Patrick McNulty, The Public Disclosure
of Private Facts: There is Life after Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 93, 125 (2001) (noting threats
B.J.F.’s mother received that B.J.F. would be raped again).
249. Johnson, supra note 225, at 226–27.
250. Id. at 228.
251. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (2011).
252. Id. at 1219–21.
253. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1973), rev’d, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
254. Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 596–97.
255. Id.
256. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). The Supreme Court followed
this case up with two other cases upholding the right of newspapers to print the names of
juvenile offenders—when they were legally obtained from police, witnesses, and prosecu-
tors—despite a law prohibiting the publication of juvenile names. See id. at 228–32
(describing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) and Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist.
Court of Okla., 430 U.S. 308 (1977)).
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predominant considerations that the Court focuses on are founda-
tional. In a simple version of this argument, free speech and
freedom of the press are necessary to properly inform citizens in a
democratic country. If the government is able to suppress speech,
then citizens will not have the correct information (the so-called
truth-seeking rationale) or the opportunity to debate values and op-
tions in order to exercise their civic responsibilities to inform their
legislators how they should vote (the self-government rationale).257
Moreover, no one will be able to stand up to a corrupt government
and show that it is abusing its power (the so-called checking ratio-
nale).258 The narratives that inform the foundational paradigm are
various: an arbitrary government administrator or agency silencing
an individual who is trying simply to tell the truth to his community
or to state his opinion; a bureaucrat, bent on calming the waters,
suppressing speech because it causes conflict; or the government, as
an efficient machine, bulldozing any dissent in the way of accom-
plishing its objective.
In cases considered here, like Cohn and Snyder, the foundational
rationale applies, particularly the slippery slope argument that, if
the government is allowed to begin suppressing some arguably less
valuable speech, it will use the opportunity to suppress more valua-
ble speech. In cases like Cohn, those in conflict are private parties—
the TV conglomerate and the family of the rape victim—and the
state, through non-disclosure laws, merely acts as a surrogate and
protector for families harmed by publication of such painful and
sensitive information. In Snyder, although the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the speech dealt with a matter of public concern, the
real conflict was between a grieving family and the speakers who
caused them emotional pain at a vulnerable time. Though many
states have passed funeral picketing statutes in response to the
Westboro Baptist Church members travelling the country to picket
funerals, even these statutes are primarily aimed at protecting vul-
nerable families, not suppressing the ideas or even methods of the
WBC.259
Creating a mediation-only cause of action against either hate
speech or speech that invades privacy would not give rise to the
257. See COLLINS & CHALTAIN, supra note 221, at 43–44, 48 (discussing Meiklejohn’s theo-
ries of truth-seeking and self-government).
258. Id. at 54 (discussing Blasi’s “checking” argument).
259. See, e.g., Major John L. Kiel, Jr., Crossing the Line: Reconciling the Right to Picket Military
Funerals with the First Amendment, 198 MIL. L. REV. 67, 78–82 (2008) (discussing intent of
funeral picketing statutes and noting a court’s finding that the New York anti-picketing stat-
ute’s “primary motive was to provide a measure of ‘protection and tranquility’ to funeral-
goers, and not to suppress certain messages because the state disagrees with their content”).
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concerns that the courts cite in protecting wrongful speech. In the
case of individual speech, the Supreme Court’s main concerns have
been to avoid either prospective self-censorship or retrospective
punishment of speakers, either civilly or criminally.260 In the case of
the press, which is usually considered a business, the concern is that
permitting civil lawsuits for publication of information will make
the business of news less viable. Newspapers and other media will
either be less courageous in ferreting out the truth, or if they are
willing to do their jobs, they will pay a heavy price that may destroy
their business operations and subsequently deprive the public of
their voice.261 Additionally, if reporters and editors can be jailed or
criminally fined for what they write or print, the individuals who
gather news will be more timid about telling the truth to the
public.262
A mediation-only remedy is not nearly so threatening. The ab-
sence of a criminal penalty should lessen the concerns of both
speakers and the press that they will be personally punished for
what they say. They cannot be arrested or prevented from saying or
printing what they will. Moreover, there is no threat of civil dam-
ages since mediation cannot produce a settlement without the
agreement of both parties, and they are not subject to the judgment
of either juries or judges that the damages they caused should be
ameliorated with large money judgments.
Of course, any time a person can be haled into court, even into
mediation, there is a cost in terms of his time and, potentially,
money if he gets legal advice about his options. He may also be
required to pay for the mediation, depending on how the funding
structure for the mediation justice system works. There is also the
hassle of having to explain himself to his victim or to a court review-
ing whether a mediation cause of action exists. Repeated requests
for mediation become burdensome on media organizations and on
individuals engaged in repetitive speech harassment like the
Westboro Baptist Church.
260. See, e.g., LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 48–49 (1986) (discussing arguments
against punishing harmful speech); William T. Mabrey, Toward a Theory of First Amendment
Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 245, 253–54, 261 (1982) (discussing Milton’s view of self-censorship and its
application in Supreme Court prior restraint cases).
261. Mabrey, supra note 260, at 254, 268–69 (noting that “the publication of speech is
increasingly monopolized by cost-conscious businesses that are not noted for ‘putting large
capital to the hazards of courage’”).
262. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 166
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing use of subpoenas and jailing reporters to get
anti-war information).
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However, such a cost seems minimal when balanced against the
harm that this kind of speech has caused other individuals—not the
government, but vulnerable persons who have no way to defend
themselves against organized and sometimes powerful groups like
churches and television conglomerates. Although it is tempting to
advocate for a bright line for protection—a few First Amendment
advocates continue to be almost absolutist in calling for no sanc-
tions for harmful speech, except perhaps in the court of public
opinion263—in real life, some speech does cause harm.
Moreover, as proposed in this Article, mandatory mediation
would be ordered only where a specific cause of action is created
through legislation or the common law. Requiring that mediation-
only causes of action be explicitly defined should eliminate much
of the guesswork from a speaker’s calculus of whether the threat of
mediation is greater than the value of his speech. Some states have
already developed well-recognized torts or specific statutory
prohibitions that give speakers advance notice of the consequences
of their actions. Although there may be torts, such as intentional
infliction of emotional distress, where the elements are not as spe-
cifically and concretely defined, state case law will be available to
speakers to understand when they are stepping over the line from
completely costless speech to speech for which they may be haled
into mediation. In cases like Snyder, the likelihood that an individ-
ual will be repeatedly haled into mediation for his harassing or
invasive speech is relatively small given that most of these situations
are context-specific, and many victims may choose to forget the
slights and move on with their lives. Should an individual continue
to harass or invade the privacy of another person, then already rec-
ognized criminal and civil causes of action come into play, such as
stalking,264 which do not raise the same First Amendment concerns
as isolated instances of “candid” speech.
Media organizations may raise a somewhat different concern: af-
fected persons may make mediation-only claims that themselves are
not problematic but that in the aggregate may be so costly as to
chill speech. Given the tortious nature of the media, mediation-only
cases are likely to surface. However, it is unlikely that reputable me-
dia or other organizations will find the numbers of mediations they
have to attend to be so significant that it will change their practices.
Taking the Cohn and Florida Star cases as examples, it may well be
263. See, e.g., Patricia R. Stembridge, 80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 920–23 (2000) (discussing views
of the ACLU and New York Times reporter Lyle Dennison on First Amendment absolutism).
264. See Robert Miller, “Stalk Talk”: A First Look at Anti-Stalking Legislation, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1303, 1305–16 (1993) (describing varieties of anti-stalking legislation).
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that the decisions to name these rape victims were thoughtless ones
made by inexperienced reporters or editors who, upon reflection,
may have acted differently, especially after the community outcry
over the decision. Alternatively, these reporters and editors may
have decided that a particular case was so unusual that naming the
victim was critical to the story—e.g., there was evidence that she
had possibly made up the story, she was a well-known person pub-
licly linked to the perpetrator, or the victim’s identity was a matter
of common knowledge in the community anyway. In these cases,
requiring a media organization to attend a single mediation is not
an onerous burden on the organization.
Of course, there remains the possibility that individuals will file
repetitive nuisance mediation-only cases against organizations.
They may imagine that a deep pocket is available or so detest the
organization’s behavior that they would like to use these cases to
get an organization like the Westboro Baptist Church to stop its
harmful activities. Once again, however, because of the lack of coer-
cive threats of a traditional lawsuit (like damages and discovery) to
back up nuisance cases, one would anticipate that very few individu-
als would find the cost of filing a mediation-only suit worth the
possible value of creating a nuisance for their opponents. Similarly,
few defendants would feel forced to settle because it would be
cheaper than attending mediation. Moreover, since these causes of
action would require sworn pleadings attesting to the specific ele-
ments of the case, if these are truly nuisance actions used to harass
a defendant with no substantive validity, the court would have the
power to punish the plaintiffs.
It is also worth considering whether the so-called “truth-seeking,”
“self-fulfillment,” or “safety valve” rationales265 of the First Amend-
ment are significant enough in these kinds of cases to outweigh the
value to injured parties of requiring attendance at mediations. If
indeed the First Amendment considers either the subjective expres-
sion of emotion or the objective explication of a fact to be an
unalloyed good regardless of its impact, then mediation causes of
action in the First Amendment context pose real problems.
However, there is little evidence that these rationales are consid-
ered absolute arguments in favor of harmful speech. The Court has
often rejected the safety valve and self-fulfillment rationales when
creating exceptions to the First Amendment. For example, the
265. See generally, BOLLINGER, supra note 260, at 45–48 (1986) (discussing the self-fulfill-
ment, truth-seeking, and self-government theories of the First Amendment); COLLINS &
CHALTAIN, supra note 221, at 55 (discussing Emerson’s “safety valve” and Bollinger’s “toler-
ance-producing” theories of the First Amendment).
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safety valve argument has not stopped the Court from refusing to
recognize protection for fighting words, true threats, libel, obscen-
ity, or inciting speech.266 Moreover, the self-fulfillment rationale has
never been considered sufficiently weighty to prevent states from
punishing obscenity, child pornography, or the “angry speech” ex-
ceptions just mentioned.267 Each of these cases recognizes that
there is a point where self-expression and speech go too far and
implicate personal or governmental interests too weighty to be
overridden by possible chilling or slippery slope concerns.
It remains to be seen whether the truth-telling rationale for
speech is sufficiently weighty to overcome mediation causes of ac-
tion for truthful (or even misleading or false) information
dissemination. Generally speaking, the truth-telling rationale has
not limited the government from punishing (or compensating with
civil damages) at least some speech that is truthful. Thus, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court permitted damages to be awarded to Hugo
Zacchini against Scripps-Howard, which filmed his entire “human
cannonball” act at the admission-fee only Geauga County Fair and
broadcast it on the 11 o’clock news, thereby diminishing its eco-
nomic value.268 National Enterprises similarly had to pay President
Ford’s publisher for printing too much of his copyrighted book.269
The same is true with many other examples of intellectual property,
including the use of famous people’s likenesses or the publication
of similar proprietary information.270 Apparently, the Court believes
that the protection of property outweighs the truth-telling rationale
of the speech clause in such cases.
However, it is worth considering whether this argument loses its
force when the harmed party’s property rights are not at stake. The
Cohn and Florida Star cases are good for testing this question since
in both examples there was arguably some truth-telling value in dis-
closing the name of the rape victim. The name is, after all, a
truthful statement. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs argued that
their non-property rights were invaded: the right to keep certain
information about themselves secret or at least private (an aspect of
266. See BOLLINGER, supra note 260, at 176–86 (discussing the incitement, fighting words,
libel, and obscenity exceptions); COLLINS & CHALTAIN, supra note 221, at 203 (discussing the
true threat exception).
267. See, e.g., COLLINS & CHALTAIN, supra note 221, at 317 (discussing the child pornogra-
phy exception).
268. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977).
269. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
270. See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peife, Prosser’s Privacy and the German Right of
Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1925, 1941–42
(2010) (discussing Prosser’s explanation of the tort of appropriation of a plaintiff’s name
and likeness).
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the right to autonomy); the right not to be openly shamed in pub-
lic; and the right to live in dignity despite the terrible injustice that
was done to them as innocent persons.271 It is difficult to under-
stand the values of a society in which economic rights like
Zacchini’s are protected and dignitary and autonomy rights like
B.J.F’s are not, but these Supreme Court cases suggest this result.
On a more practical level, both federal and state laws protect the
identity of certain victims of sexual abuse if the trial court lays the
appropriate predicate for the use of initials or pseudonyms in place
of the victim’s true name.272 The fact that these laws have not been
successfully overturned, even though most plaintiffs have lost their
lawsuits for publication of their names,273 implies that the Cohn line
of cases is not a blank check for the press to disclose embarrassing,
truthful information. Rather, the suppression of such information
must be based on context in cases of substantial demonstrable
harm or likelihood of such harm.
The rationale for protecting media and others who publish infor-
mation that would violate a state law or common law right loses
much of its force when we replace traditional criminal or civil suits
with mediation-only causes of action. Even assuming that a particu-
lar media organization decided that it had a First Amendment duty
to publish the name of every rape victim, it is not clear what harm
or even chilling effect the media outlet would suffer by being re-
quired to appear at mediation and explain to the women whom
they had harmed why they felt ethically obliged to disclose their
identities. If this policy were indeed a matter of principle, the me-
dia outlet would presumably have a strong incentive and desire to
explain this principle to someone who felt unjustifiably harmed by
the disclosure. Moreover, such an explanation is more than
mandatory mediation even requires of a wrongdoer in most states
that use court-annexed mediation, where a defendant could appear
at the mediation and refuse to speak or even to listen.
271. See, e.g., McNulty, supra note 248, at 125 (noting that B.J.F.’s right was to “civilly
protect the ‘essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any
decent system of ordered liberty’”).
272. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(3) (2006) (permitting the use of pseudonyms in federal
cases where the judge determines that requiring the child to testify and be identified in open
court would cause substantial psychological harm); Patrick Noaker, Using Pseudonyms in Sex-
ual Abuse Cases, BENCH & B. MINN. 16, 17–18 (Feb. 7, 2012) (describing federal court and
Minnesota court provisions for the protection of the identity of victims in criminal and civil
cases while noting that the law for civil plaintiffs in Minnesota is not so clear). But see John-
son, supra note 225, at 203 (noting that although courts have not invalidated state criminal
statutes preventing disclosure of rape victims’ names, they have put into question whether
such statutes can ever be constitutionally enforced).
273. See generally Johnson, supra note 225, at 203–25.
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Indeed, those who use hate speech may want their victims to hear
their point of view in a face-to-face encounter, whether to win them
over to the hater’s point of view or to exacerbate the pain they
cause. It does not appear that the Westboro Baptist Church would
want to avoid a confrontation with the victims, the Snyders, if the
Snyders asked for mediation. Those who actually believe that they
are telling the truth and stand on principle, as apparently the
Church does, would be unlikely to view the opportunity to spew
their views in even closer proximity to their victims as chilling their
speech. On the other hand, those speakers whose true purpose is to
intimidate their victims might well be foiled since the presence of
others in the room would buffer the coercive or harmful effects of
their speech. However, to suggest that requiring them to mediate
after they engage in hate speech will chill their willingness to use
such speech in the future seems far-fetched. The truth-telling ratio-
nale is, then, no longer an excuse for protecting the speech.
It is still worth questioning what the point of spending public
resources to require a likely recalcitrant speaker to come into a
meeting with his victim is. If the speaker stands on principle, argu-
ing that the public needs to know “as fact” the comments he is
making, it seems unlikely that he will change his mind after a meet-
ing with his victim.
As suggested earlier, however, there may be many reasons that
someone who has used speech to harm another might come to re-
gret his actions. For instance, the defendant may not have had the
context to understand his victim’s situation and history. One can
imagine that a defendant who must come face-to-face with the per-
son he has harmed may discover someone with whom he may share
interests or values and may change his mind about the truthfulness
or value of his speech. Or, as in the Cohn and Florida Star cases, a
speaker may not have had the life experience to understand how
what appears to be a seemingly innocent disclosure has damaged
his victim. Mediation might serve to educate him as to what a rape
victim endures in the aftermath of such a tragedy. Alternatively, he
may persist in his belief that this speech was not wrongful but agree
to discontinue it as a matter of respect or accommodation to his
victim and his community. Any of these “change of heart” exper-
iences may cause him to be willing to make an apology to his victim,
which may be more important than damages or settlement. Finally,
the wrongdoer may find an alternative solution that ameliorates
some of the unintended consequences of his behavior. What differ-
ence would it have made for the Cohn family if Cox Broadcasting,
having disclosed the name of their daughter, reported on all of the
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cruelty the family was experiencing and editorialized about the
wrongfulness of the taunting that they suffered? Litigation could
not obtain that remedy for the Cohns, but mediation could.
Even if the speaker is unmoved by the harms caused to his vic-
tims, as perhaps Westboro Baptist Church members seem to be,
mediation can empower victims to reclaim their sense of dignity
and control over their lives. By expressing anger, telling their per-
petrators how they have been harmed, and seeing their
perpetrators’ lives, they may be able to put the wrongs they have
suffered into perspective and move beyond them to a healthier
emotional life. In some cases, being able to understand why a
speaker would feel obliged to engage in the behavior that harmed
the victim might take some of the sting out of the harm, as the
victim can realize that the act was not a personal attack.
CONCLUSION
We should be moved to decry the inability of the common law
system to bring justice to many who have suffered wrongs that all
recognize as tragic for the victims, particularly those harms that
wound the dignity and the spirit of vulnerable human beings. In
some cases, relief exists in theory through private causes of action,
but systemic flaws such as the lack of available counsel, inadequate
judicial personnel, or public ignorance about rights stymie justice.
In some cases, bringing a lawsuit or otherwise seeking justice simply
prolongs the difficulties and pain of the victim, thus pouring salt
into a wound that cannot heal through law. In other cases, the law
is irredeemably inadequate to bring justice because the injustice is
beyond any repair. Yet, in some cases like the ones considered here,
society has stayed the hand of the law, preventing parties from
bringing claims, primarily because of larger public concerns, such
as the protection of constitutional rights, that outweigh the injus-
tice suffered by particular victims. In some of these cases, justice
can be offered to victims through court-connected mandatory me-
diation, but first, causes of action need to be defined so everyone
knows when wrongdoers can be expected to face their victims.
As this Article suggests, justice is much larger than a judgment,
an award of damages, or a court’s order for a wrongdoer to cease
his behavior. Sometimes it means granting a victim an opportunity
to face her wrongdoer, to express her pain, to seek explanation, to
demand apology. Sometimes it means bringing the community to
bear on a wrongdoer so that he can recognize the depth of suffer-
ing he has caused, accept responsibility for it, offer an explanation,
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and perhaps make some attempt to mend the wrong as best he can.
Sometimes it means making the community aware of its own re-
sponsibility to both victim and wrongdoer to help them to turn a
new page in their lives.
These are the values that undergird the transformative media-
tion and restorative justice movements, and these are the values
that court-connected mandatory mediation can bring if a new medi-
ation-only jurisprudence were implemented, not to replace, but to
supplement the work of the common law courts. Much like the
breath of new life that equity once brought to the common law
courts, court-connected mediation can serve the common law as a
rival for justice. Indeed, such a system, with its defined causes of
action and processes that engage conflict, can serve as an inspira-
tion to the common law and a reminder that justice need not be
broken at its edges.
